Tournament: Glenbrook | Round: 1 | Opponent: Against neg debaters | Judge: when i affirm
I advocate for a system of truth-seeking commissions that focus on reconciling the damage done individual community in the past.

I advocate total abolition of communications (general sense of res).

I advocate abolition of corporate ACP (full text disclosed).

Tournament: meadows | Round: 1 | Opponent: all people NEG vs me | Judge:
framework: OH BTW I PLAN ON READING THIS UTIL FRAMEWORK FOR MY AFF AT MEADOWS SO ITS PREDICTABLE YOU SHITS.

First, the state exists because citizens willingly give it a monopoly on coercive...

Second, is no act omission distinction Vermule 

IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED?ACTS,OMISSIONS, AND LIFELIFE TRADEOFFS Cass R. Sunstein* and Adrian Vermeule 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM

In our view... or fully discourage it.
The lack of an act-omission distinction necessitates util because it forces us to view the end-state as one with the action. So, all state actions must maximize the best end state.
 Third, util is the fairest framework because:
a. Ground:

b. Predictability:

Fourth, util is the most educational framework because: a. we ought to Roleplay policy makers Shaw 

PEDAGOGY IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Using Role-Play Scenarios in the IR Classroom: An Examination of Exercises on Peacekeeping Operations and Foreign Policy Decision Making CAROLYN M. SHAW Wichita State University

The use of role-playing in... is in our ‘‘national interest.’’

And policymakers are utilitarian Goodin

  (Robert, philosopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)
 

Consider, first, the... various possible choices.

Education is key to debate because there needs to be an educational backbone to make the debates we have valuable or else the debate becomes meaningless and because the education of a round is what we hold years from this round.

Fifth, aff gets to choose the ethical framework of the round if it’s disclosed on the ndca wiki. (a) Resolvability – Multiple frameworks give the judge many layers to interact between and since the round is only 45 minutes there won’t be a sufficient amount of interaction leading to more intervention. Judge intervention is bad for fairness because it allows outside argumentation to skew the round. (b) Depth – Each argument has a significant amount of time spent on it thus there is greater development within each of the speeches because there are fewer issues to do analysis with. Depth is key because without it we get a superficial knowledge of the topic literature and don't actually question the warrants of arguments (c) Predictability - It’s a predictable framework because on the NDCA wiki so you could have prepped offense against it which also means there is an opportunity to have an actual substantive debate under my framework. 

Thus the aff advocacy is to abolish corporate attorney client privilege thru constitutional amendment Lingo  is the solvency advocate

Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: Can Corporate Officers Waive the Corporation’s Privilege? DECEMBER 2012 BY JESSICA LINGO TENNESSEE BUSINESS LITIGATION NEWSLETTER

The U.S. Supreme Court has long upheld the importance of attorney-client privilege, because the privilege “encourages full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Both “the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it” and “the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice” are protected. The privilege applies both to individual and to corporate clients. Nonetheless, claims of privilege in the modern corporate context have faced challenges because counsel have become widely involved in business operations, “rendering decisions about business, technical, scientific, public relations, and advertising issues, as well as purely legal issues.” In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007).

This is thru const amendment

My implementation is through a constitutional amendment this is best for three reasons:
(a) It gets rid of debating between two violations of the legal system which are impossible to weigh between – either way laws are broken
(b) Gets rid of unturnable side constraint NCs about what certain documents say
(c) Legal question are irrelevant to our post-legal society Engelhardt 

Dumb Question of the Twenty-first Century: Is It Legal? By TOM ENGELHARDT • May 31, 2011 The American Conservative

Is the Libyan war legal? Was Bin Laden’s killing legal? Is it legal for the president of the United States to target an American citizen for assassination? Were those “enhanced interrogation techniques” legal? These are all is a questions raised in recent weeks. Each seems to call out for debate, for answers. Or does it? Now, you couldn’t call me a legal scholar. I’ve never set foot inside a law school, and in 66 years only made it onto a single jury (dismissed before trial when the civil suit was settled out of court). Still, I feel at least as capable as any constitutional law professor of answering such questions. My answer is this: they are but is irrelevant. Think of them as twentieth-century questions that don’t begin to come to grips with twenty-first century American realities. In fact, think of them, and the very idea of a nation based on the rule of law, as a reflection of nostalgia for, or sentimentality about, a long-lost republic. At least in terms of what used to be called “foreign policy,” and more recently “national security,” the United States is now a post-legal society. (And you could certainly include in this mix the too-big-to-jail financial and corporate elite.) It’s easy enough to explain what I mean. If, in a country theoretically organized under the rule of law, wrongdoers are never brought to justice and nobody is held accountable for possibly serious crimes, then you don’t have to be a constitutional law professor to know that its citizens actually exist in a post-legal state. If so, “Is it legal?” is thus the wrong question to be asking, even if we have yet to discover the right one.

Attorney Client Privilege let’s Corporations split cases up Huggard and Dudley

Bloomberg Law THE SWORD, A SHIELD, AND SEVERANCE: THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS By Stephen G. Huggard and Hilary B. Dudley, Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP

The recent health care fraud case United States v. Stryker Biotech et al.1 demonstrates the opportunities that exist for criminal defendants in cases where a company is indicted alongside its executives. At the same time, it provides leverage for company counsel during their pre-charge negotiations with the government. Simply put, if the government indicts the company and the executives together and counsel were consulted about the conduct at issue, then the government risks a severed case and multiple trials—usually a benefit to the defense and a problem for the prosecution. Much has been written about the Department of Justice’s 2008 decision to formally disavow the controversial practice of coercing corporations under investigation to waive their attorney-client privilege to avoid indictment. But many prosecutors and defense counsel have yet to focus on the likelihood and implications of severance as a result of corporations no longer being forced to waive their privilege… On Feb. 7, 2005, W.R. Grace and Co. and seven of its executives were indicted on 10 criminal counts, ranging from conspiracy to wire fraud. The charges related to a mine in Libby, Mont., that exposed workers to asbestos poisoning. The government alleged that W.R. Grace and the individual defendants conspired to keep critical scientific information regarding the asbestos dangers from the government and knowingly endangered workers for decades. Prior to trial, five of the executives moved to sever their trials on the basis that they intended to rely upon an advice-of-counsel defense that could be established only through documents and testimony over which W.R. Grace claimed an attorney-client privilege. In response to the government’s charge that the defendants were manufacturing a privilege issue to force severance, W.R. Grace filed a statement confirming its intention to invoke the attorney-client privilege in light of the lasting impact any waiver might have on pending and potential civil litigation.16 The court reviewed the documents submitted under seal by the individual defendants and determined that they “may, depending on the proof at trial, be of such probative and exculpatory value as to compel admission of the evidence over Defendant Grace’s objection as the attorney-client privilege holder.”17 However, the court went on to conclude that only two of the individual defendants—the former in-house counsel, O. Mario Favorito, and the former general manager who became the community representative responsible for communicating with the Environmental Protection Agency, Alan R. Stringer—identified “documents of significant exculpatory value the admission of which is as incompatible with Grace’s right to a fair trial.”18 As a result, the court severed Favorito and Stringer to be tried after W.R. Grace and the other individual defendants. In the end, Stringer died before the trial and Favorito was never tried because the corporation and the other individual defendants were acquitted after an almost three-month trial in the spring of 2009…We are cautiously entering new territory and new risks with big white collar criminal investigations. For individuals, it means that their employer cannot prevent them from disclosing exculpatory reliance on legal advice forever. For companies that elect to maintain the corporate attorney-client privilege, this ruling it means that they may be able to prevent compelled pretrial disclosure of privileged material, but they are not going to be able to prevent individual employees from presenting truly exculpatory attorney-client advice and communications at trial when the individuals are in jeopardy. Once that can of worms is opened, it will require diligent and creative containment efforts by the company to minimize the scope of the disclosure and the collateral consequences of the disclosure. For the government, it means an increased likelihood of multiple trials if the government chooses to prosecute companies for alleged pervasive fraud schemes that involved in-house or outside counsel in addition to individual employees who consulted with and relied on in-house or outside counsel’s involvement in the allegedly fraudulent scheme.

Severed Trials help corporations U of Montana 

http://archive.umt.edu/gracecase/about-2/motion-to-sever/20UM20Grace20Case20University20of20Montana Motion to Sever University of Montana

The government obtained one indictment against WR Grace and seven former executives of the corporation. The government charged the corporation with conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States and to defraud government agencies, violations of the Clean Air Act, and obstruction of justice. In addition, the seven former executives are all also charged with conspiracy. Generally, when the government indicts several individuals in a single indictment, all of the individuals will go to trial at the same time. In this case, therefore, WR Grace and the seven executives are all considered co-defendants and would tried at the same time in one large trial. Courts prefer that all co-defendants be tried in a single trial rather than each defendant being tried alone. A single trial of multiple co-defendants because it preserves resources, reduces the burden and inconvenience on witnesses and government agencies, and decreases the delay in bringing those accused of crime to trial. This is particularly true in prosecutions for conspiracy because the same evidence is generally admissible against all of the co-defendants. Multiple trials, on the other hand, dramatically increase inefficiencies because the court is tied up for longer on the same case, the witnesses must testify repeatedly, and multiple juries must be convened. When the government alleges that several people have worked together to commit a crime, such as in a conspiracy, a single trial can also be advantageous for the prosecution. When all of the co-defendants are present in a single trial, the government can try its case one time to one jury. The single jury hears all of the evidence pertaining to all of the defendants. In addition, when all of the co-defendants are tried together, the defendants are also unable to take advantage of the “empty chair” defense. In the “empty chair” defense, which is when a defendant attempts to shift blame from themselves onto the missing co-defendant, the “empty chair.” When all of the co-defendants are tried together, efforts to shift blame to other co-defendants is more difficult because the co-defendant is present and can resist those efforts. Often, this will lead to co-defendants working to prove that the other co-defendants are the guilty parties, a situation that makes the prosecution’s job to prove the guilt of the defendants that much easier.

And corporations that get away with fraud cause economic harm and death to Americans Mokhiber 

Russel Mokhiber Twenty Things You Should Know About Corporate Crime June 15th 2007 http://www.alternet.org/story/54093/twenty_things_you_should_know_about_corporate_crime

20. Corporate crime inflicts far more damage on society than all street crime combined. Whether in bodies or injuries or dollars lost, corporate crime and violence wins by a landslide. The FBI estimates, for example, that burglary and robbery -- street crimes -- costs the nation $3.8 billion a year. 1 The losses from a handful of major corporate frauds -- Tyco, Adelphia, Worldcom, Enron – swamp us the losses from all street robberies and burglaries combined. Health care fraud alone costs Americans $100 billion to $400 billion a year. The savings and loan fraud -- which former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh called "the biggest white collar swindle in history" -- cost us anywhere from $300 billion to $500 billion. And then you have your lesser frauds: auto repair fraud, $40 billion a year, securities fraud, $15 billion a year -- and on down the list. 19. 2 Corporate crime is often violent crime. Recite this list of corporate frauds and people will immediately say to you: but you can’t compare street crime and corporate crime -- corporate crime is not violent crime. Not true. Corporate crime is often violent crime. The FBI estimates that, 16,000 Americans are murdered every year. Compare this to the 56,000 Americans who die every year on the job or from occupational diseases such as black lung and asbestosis and the tens of thousands of other Americans who fall victim to the silent violence of pollution, contaminated foods, hazardous consumer products, and hospital malpractice. These deaths are often the result of criminal recklessness. Yet, they are rarely prosecuted as homicides or as criminal violations of federal laws. 

Second, corporations get away with a lot of stuff because of technicalities with the attorney client privilege Waldman 

Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, 28 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 473 (1987), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss3/4

The second and related concern was that corporations would manipulate an expansive attorney-corporate client privilege so as to privilege all embarrassing or incriminating documents. Images abounded of a corporations use using the privilege "to funnel its papers and documents into the hands of its lawyers ... to avoid disclosure and using its corporate counsel as the "exclusive repository of unpleasant facts." Unlike an individual a corporate client could structure its procedures so as to privilege much of its routine transactions through transmittal to counsel. As one court noted "in the corporate context given the large number of employees, frequent dealings with lawyers and masses of documents, the zone of silence grows large. The control group test met this concern by ensuring removal of routine intra-corporate communications from the privilege's protection.

Fraud causes economic busts Hunter 

Recession and They Are Able To Do It Now With Impunity” – One-On-One With Professor William Black – Greg Hunter Sunday, August 12, 2012 22:07

Professor William Black is an outspoken critic of Wall Street. Black, a former bank regulator and professor of law and economics says, “Outright fraud caused the great recession and they are able to do it now with impunity.” Not a single financial elite that caused the crisis has gone to jail. Because laws are not enforced and crooked bankers are allow to do whatever they wish, Black says “Each crisis is getting bigger by an order of magnitude.” Meaning the next financial meltdown is assured to be much greater that the last. According to Professor Black, “Just the household sector lost $11 trillion, a trillion is a thousand billion.” He goes on to say, “You can get to the point where even the United States could be thrown into a long term collapse scenario.” When I asked, “Any day something could happen and we could be in another collapse?” The Professor unequivocally replied, “Yes.” Join Greg Hunter as he goes One-on-One with Professor William Black

Economic decline causes great power wars—multiple studies Royal 

RoyalDirector of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the US Dept. of Defense, 10
Jedidiah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crisis,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, 2010 p. 205-224bg

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflicts as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remains unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggest that “future expectation of trade” is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace item such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory” suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a “rally around the flag” effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995) and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states due to the fact the democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. De DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States and thus weak Presidential popularity are statically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Underview:

1. Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

2. The neg must defend one unconditional policy option. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

Tournament: All | Round: 1 | Opponent: Me | Judge: Me
Dhruvwaliaman@gmail.com
or Facebook: Dhruv Walia
contact me if you can't get access to something or i forgot something

Tournament: glenbrook | Round: 3 | Opponent: Jason Smith | Judge: Grant Weisberg
I affirm.
Framework is Haziq Siddiqi’s
Sander-Staudt  defines the ethics of care

The moral theory … reasoning from particulars. 

Only intent is normatively valuable for four reasons:

Second, Valuing intent is logically prior because actions need intentions to exist in the first place Mitesh 

One area that… name out in the public? 

Third, Because the only thing we can control is intention, morality would fail to be a guide to action if it evaluated more than just the intent Johnson  

In Kant’s terms, … action have moral worth.  

Fourth, The thought and intent behind an action unifies it meaning intent is all that is valuable Rodl writes 

Calculation from desire …, be doing B.

The standard is consistency with the ethic of care for four reasons:

First, Before we create an adequate conception of ethics, we must have an accurate ontology. Because of the interconnected nature of ethics, we cannot understand obligations without accurately understanding our relation with the world Kowalko  1

Ethics is a … from our ethics. 

Thus, we must turn to the ethics of care, which is most ontologically accurate because care defines personhood Engster 

In this respect, … and neglect. (Maclntyre 1999: 4) 

Second, Impersonal abstract ethics that stress universal rules like deontology and utilitarianism fail to account for our embodiment in the world Kowalko  2 gives 2 warrants

An adequate conception … motivation would be lost.

Third, An ethics of care is a pre-requisite to the existence of the justice system and human society Tong and Williams  1

Like other feminists … persons to respect.” Ellipses inserted by author (Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care 2006, p. 17)

Fourth, The ethics of care is discursively good because it prevents the marginalization of women’s moral voice Tong and Williams  2

Although Gilligan concedes … rights and rules.

And, Discursive justifications come before substantive justifications because the discourse we use determines reality Wisnant  

Discourse creates a …construction of reality. 

I advocate for a system of truth-seeking commissions that focus on reconciling the damage done individual community in the past. Falcon 

In general, truth … structure and organization.

A Subpoint: is that Truth commissions intend on healing and fostering relationships Woody 09
A third common … by past wrongs.43

Further, truth commissions are preferable to the status quo as it seeks to benefit victims and society as a whole, it focuses on what happened to them. Woody 2 :
Restorative justice is … as the victim.

B Subpoint is that - in TRCs, truth is prioritized over privileged evidence Myers 

Of course, offenders … when he gets out.

  Maureen Sander-Staudt Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University “Care Ethics” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mar 18 2011) http://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/
  Mitesh “It’s The Intention That Counts” MKapadia (Jul 4 2009)
  Johnson, Robert, "Kant's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/kant-moral/.
  Rödl, Sebastian. Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2000
  John Kowalko “Ontological Ethics” (April 2010) Bachelor’s Thesis for Wesleyan University Dept of Philosophy http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1524andcontext=etd_hon_theses
  Daniel Engster Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Texas San Antonio The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory (2007) Oxford University Press.
  John Kowalko “Ontological Ethics” (April 2010) Bachelor’s Thesis for Wesleyan University Dept of Philosophy http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1524andcontext=etd_hon_theses
  Rosemarie Tong Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Williams College and Nancy Williams “Feminist Ethics” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-ethics/#FemAppEth  
  Rosemarie Tong Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Williams College and Nancy Williams “Feminist Ethics” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-ethics/#FemAppEth
  Dr. Clayton Wisnant Associate Professor of European History @ Wofford College “Foucault and Discourse” Wofford College http://webs.wofford.edu/whisnantcj/his389/foucault_discourse.pdf
  The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Treatment of Sexual Violence Against Women Julissa Mantilla Falcon 2005
  Woody 09 (Katherine Woody, Juris Doctor, Law, Certificate in International and Comparative Law from Chicago Kent School of Law, Spring 2009, Kent Law, “Truth and Justice: The Role of Truth Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies”)
  Woody 09 (Katherine Woody, Juris Doctor, Law, Certificate in International and Comparative Law from Chicago Kent School of Law, Spring 2009, Kent Law, “Truth and Justice: The Role of Truth Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies”)
  Truth and reconciliation commission 101: What TRCs can teach the United States Justice System About Justice Roslyn Myers Fordham Law School June 2008

Tournament: berkz | Round: 3 | Opponent: berkz | Judge: berkz
Thus the plan is to have locals in developing nations regulate and manage the forest through mandate via communal organizations, which is the best way to prioritize the environment

Tournament: Berkeley | Round: 4 | Opponent: people | Judge: people
Forestry is part of the resource sector and trades off with environmental protection. The authors are forestry experts.
Alavapati and Adamowicz 99 writes  AT
It is very well documented that activities related to resource sectors (agriculture, forestry, or energy) may cause damage to the environment (Duchesne 1991; OECD 1995; Tsigas et al 1996). Therefore, public agencies often impose restrictions such as taxes on inputs or outputs, standards on management practices, and even preservation or closure of areas from production to control environmental damage. For example, the government of Alberta (Canada) in 1995 chose to restrict logging near the Rocky Mountain foothills because of environmental concerns. Similarly, a proposed coal mine near Jasper National Park, also in Canada, attracted much criticism from environmentalists; they thought that the new mine would adversely affect wildlife habitat and thus the park's experiential quality. Again, in the Paci®c Northwest of the United States, large tracts of forest are closed to logging to protect the habitat for spotted owl. Further, arguments that intensive use of pesticides and fertilizers in agriculture cause ecological damage have led the US government to undertake an acreage reduction program in the agricultural sector (Tobey and Reinert 1991). On the other hand, it is generally believed that tourism is a ``green'' sector that does not harm the environment. The industry is also often characterized as an economic activity that employs relatively simple technologies, draws abundant domestic labor, requires limited capital investments, earns substantial net foreign exchange, ALAVALAPATI AND ADAMOWICZ 189 and constrains industrial expansion and thus urbanization (Eadington and Redman 1991). As a result, it is not common to see resistance against the expansion of activities related to this sector. However, a close observation of a tourism-dependent region suggests that activities related to it impact the local environment. For example, rapid growth in tourism has caused an increase in forest ®res and extinction of plant species in Mediterranean forests; led to more forest felling and ®res in the Himalayas; and resulted in the damage of coral reefs in Kenya, Madagascar, and the Seychelles (UNEP 1992). Increases in arrivals and construction of tourism facilities have led to declines in the clarity of water, ozone damage to conifers as a result of auto exhaust, and degradation in the scenic quality of Lake Tahoe in the mountains along the California±Nevada border (Healy 1994:599). If environmental costs associated with tourism development are accounted for, this industry may not necessarily bring the highest economic returns or always bene®t the environment and society (Inskeep 1987). The environmental impacts of tourism which were underestimated in the past are now receiving attention. For example, Page, Bayley, Cook, Green and Richie (1996) have noted that if tourist numbers and related development are allowed to continue, serious and irreversible harm to Banff National Park's ecological integrity and its value as a national park may result. Based on their recommendations, the Heritage Minister of the government of Canada announced a series of restrictions on park use. These include establishing limits and reservation systems on the most popular hiking trails, eliminating all sport ®shing, closing some hotels/campgrounds, and capping the permanent population of the town of Banff at 10,000. As another example, automobile access was restricted to the Maroon Bells Wilderness Area in Colorado because fumes from tourists' cars were polluting the mountain environment (Healy 1994:599). The foregoing discussion suggests that failure to incorporate the environmental impacts and feedback effects of tourism in economic analysis may result in overestimating the signi®- cance of the industry in regional economies. Therefore, research focusing on the linkages between environmental impacts and tourism activity is sorely needed. This study provides a theoretical framework to model interactions among tourism, other economic sectors, and the environment. First, the model incorporates linkages between the tourism sector and environmental damage and focuses discussion on the implications for the regional economy. Second, the study considers two types of environmental damage functions: it assumes that economic activity related to resource sectors affects the local environment; and it considers that activities of both the resource and tourism sectors affect the environment. Third, the study emphasizes a region where the resource and tourism sectors compete for a scarce resource such as public land. Fourth, it points out a number of areas where future research is needed to extend and apply the model to a particular region. At present, models designed to assess the economic impacts 190 MODELING TOURISM IMPACTS of alternative policies, be they input-output type models or computable general equilibrium (CGE) ones, tend not to incorporate speci®c linkages with the environment. This paper outlines an approach for constructing this linkage and illustrates the implications of such relations on economic impact assessments. A variety of methodologies have been used to estimate the economic impacts of tourism activities. Some researchers have used input±output (I±O) models to identify the economy-wide impacts of changes in the demand for tourism-related products (Archer and Fletcher 1996; Johnson and Moore 1993). Wagner (1997) used a social account matrix (SAM) to examine the economic effects of tourism. Lindberg and Johnson (1997) examined the effects of tourism using a contingent valuation (CV) approach. Although I±O and SAM models provide a convenient framework to incorporate intersectoral linkages, they suffer from their inability to consider the behavioral responses of producers and consumers with respect to changes in prices. On the other hand the CV approach does not account for intersectoral linkages of the economy. Therefore, some researchers have used a CGE model to examine the economic effects of tourism (Adams and Parmenter 1995; Copeland 1991; Zhou et al 1997). The CGE approach not only accounts for intersectoral linkages but also permits the prices of inputs to vary with respect to changes in output prices and accommodates the indirect effects of a policy change on the overall economy (Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson 1982; Shoven and Whalley 1992). Because of these attractive features, in this study, a CGE approach was chosen to model interactions among tourism, other sectors, and the environment. MODELING TOURISM IMPACTS The model is kept as simple and general as possible to emphasize the interactions between the economy and environment and their impact on tourism. This model is similar to Jones (1965) but is extended to incorporate environmental damages and tourism. A small regional economy with two productive sectors is considered: the resource sector which includes forestry, agriculture, or energy; and the composite tourism sector. The resource sector is assumed to be a net exporter and price taker in the international market. It is further assumed that all goods and services produced by tourism are consumed in the domestic market and thus treated as a nontraded sector. Tourists from external regions who visit the region also consume these goods and services but within the regional market. This implies that a change in their number causes a shift in the ®nal demand for tourism goods and services. The regional economy consists of two factors of production: a composite input consisting of labor and capital, and land. It is assumed that both inputs are used in each sector and are mobile across these. Furthermore, it is considered that all factor endowments are fully employed between the ALAVALAPATI AND ADAMOWICZ 191 two. For the sake of simplicity, factor mobility across regions is ignored. 

First, deforestation rates and forest exploitation are at a new high Zolfagharifard 13 

The destruction caused by deforestation, wildfires and storms on our planet have been revealed in unprecedented detail. High-resolution maps released by Google show how global forests experienced an overall loss of 1.5 million sq km during 2000-2012. For comparison, that’s a loss of forested land equal in size to the entire state of Alaska. The maps, created by a team involving Nasa, Google and the University of Maryland researchers, used images from the Landsat satellite. Each pixel in a Landsat image showing an area about the size of a baseball diamond, providing enough data to zoom in on a local region. Before this, country-to-country comparisons of forestry data were not possible at this level of accuracy. ‘When you put together datasets that employ different methods and definitions, it's hard to synthesise,’ said Matthew Hansen at the University of Maryland, With Landsat, as a polar-orbiting instrument that takes the same quality pictures everywhere, we can apply the same algorithm to forests in the Amazon, in the Congo, in Indonesia, and so on. Professor Hansen looked at 143 billion pixels in 654,000 Landsat images to compile maps of forest loss and gain between 2000 and 2012. During that period, 888,000 square miles (2.3 million square kilometers) of forest were lost, and 309,000 square miles (800,000 square kilometers) regrew. The team found the deforestation rate in most countries increased. Indonesia's deforestation rate doubled in the study period, from approximately 3,900 square miles (10,000 square kilometers) per year in 2000-2003 to more than 7,700 square miles (20,000 square kilometers) in 2011-2012. ‘This is the first time somebody has been able to do a wall-to-wall, global Landsat analysis of all the world's forests - where they're being cleared, where they're regrowing, and where they're subject to natural disturbances,’ said Jeff Masek, Landsat project scientist at the Goddard Space Flight Center. The maps also illustrate the impact of politics on land cover. For instance, on the island of Borneo, the maps clearly show the border between Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia's heavy logging along forest roads is visible right up to the Indonesian border, where forests were still largely intact as of 2012. In Côte d'Ivoire, a civil war in 2002 corresponded with intense deforestation of several previously protected nature reserves. A different pattern of change appears in the southeastern U.S., where landowners harvest trees for timber and quickly plant their replacements' ‘Of this eco-region in the southeast, 30 per cent of the forest land was regrown or lost during this period,’ Professor Hansen said. ‘It's incredibly intensive. Trees are really treated like a crop in this region.’ In Alabama, Landsat detected miles-long streaks of destroyed forest. When the researchers examined the year-by-year record, they found the damage occurred in 2011 after a violent tornado season. Brazil cut its deforestation rate from approximately 15,400 square miles (40,000 square kilometers) per year to approximately 7,700 square miles (20,000 square kilometers) per year. ‘That's the result of a concerted policy effort to reduce deforestation, and it sets a standard for the rest of the world,’ Professor Hansen said. However, the Brazilian government yesterday revealed that deforestation in the Amazon increased by nearly a third over the past year. Satellite data for the 12 months through the end of July showed that deforestation in the area climbed by 28 per cent compared with a year earlier. Although scattered, the total land cleared during the period amounted to 2,256 square miles (5,843 square km)- an area almost the size of the U.S. state of Delaware. The figure, fulfilled predictions by scientists and environmentalists, based on figures compiled through the year, that destruction was on the rise again. ‘You can't argue with numbers,’ said Marcio Astrini, coordinator for the Amazon campaign at the Brazilian chapter of Greenpeace, the environmentalist group. ‘This is not alarmist - it's a real and measured inversion of what had been a positive trend.’ 

And, the only way to solve deforestation is to have people who are motivated stop it Ascher 94

Individuals and groups must be motivated to grow trees, and to exploit the forest's non-timber resources, on an on-going basis. Opportunities for economic gain or contributions to meeting everyday needs are what give the forests their value in the eyes of the society and the government. Harvesting, especially if done with discipline and combined with resource development (such as replanting), can be sustainable. Successful forestry programs must therefore combine opportunities for economic gain and distribute management resources in such a way that users have an incentive to maintain the forests sustainably.

Thus the plan is to have locals in developing nations regulate and manage the forest through mandate via communal organizations, which is the best way to prioritize the environment Ascher  2

The survival and quality of forests in most developing countries depend on the strength of community forestry organizations formed by the people traditionally involved in forest use. These organizations, with assistance-rather than control-from the government, are essential for promoting forest development and limiting forest extraction. While it is on the rise, community controlled governmental and private control over natural forests have led to the rapid disappearance of these forests. The overall statistics-that the world's forests shrunk at a rate of 1.8 between the late 1970s and the late 1980s'-obscure even more drastic deforestation in many developing countries and even greater declines in the availability of marketable timber, fuelwood, and foods. Demand for timber, agricultural land, and pastures has put enormous pressure on the forests. The apparent alternative of state or private plantations has failed in many countries, for both economic and physical reasons. At the same time, government efforts to induce people to plant trees often fail because government incentives are not sufficient to prevent inappropriate deforestation or to fulfill expectations of government-sponsored replanting. New approaches that address people's motivations to develop and nurture forests responsibly are clearly needed. Local people are often the most appropriate managers and regulators of forest uses for four reasons. 

The plan motivates individuals to combat deforestation in two ways:

1. Using communities to motivate sustainable forestry works Ascher 3

First, limiting the number of users can reduce the pressure on the forest resource. Traditional forest users are typically few in number compared to the total number of potential forest users, and the intensity of traditional forest uses is usually modest or moderate. "Community forestry" should mean. Second, traditional forest users living in or near the forest site have an interest in the long-term sustainability of that the forest, as long as they know that they will be able continue to enjoy the benefits of the forest. Given that traditional users depend on the forest for at least a portion of their income, they will be more likely to guard the long-term future of the resources. Third, Further if the government permits local forest users to police the forest, then effective regulation has a real chance. The government can rarely do so itself, due to chronic shortages in funding and staff. With government regulation, people intent on encroaching into the forest know that they run the risk of facing only a few .government forest guards; with community forestry, invaders run the risk of facing a whole community mobilized to protect its forest-use rights. Fourth, Finally traditional forest users are generally more likely to have developed practices that are compatible with the long term survival of the forest. because Other groups, are less familiar with the forest, are more likely to engage in short-sighted practices. 

2. The nature of communal forestry involves the rural populations creating incentive for participation Arnold 92
Community forestry was seen to comprised of three main elements. These were, the provision of “fuel and other goods essential to meeting basic needs at the rural household and community level”, the provision of “food and the environmental stability necessary for continued food production” and the generation of “income and employment in the rural community” (FAO 1978). This definition thus encompassed a broad spectrum of possible linkages between people and trees, or the outputs of trees, and was as much concerned with people's dependence on existing forests as with reforestation. It was stressed that community forestry must be an integral part of rural development and the “basic precept ... (that) the central purpose of rural development is to help the poor become self-reliant ... Forestry for community development must therefore be forestry for the people and involving the people. It must be forestry which starts at the 'grass roots'” (FAO 1978). From its inception, therefore, community forestry was seen as being, by definition, participatory and directed towards rural needs - in particular the needs of the rural poor, both women and men. A distinguishing feature of the first generation of projects and programmes in support of community forestry has as a consequence been an attempt to build them on active participation of the population, with external involvement being of a supportive rather than management nature. Two things are of note at this point. One is the speed with which community forestry took shape and spread as a concept and policy. The second is the sense that it was urgent to act quickly to respond to some of the perceived problems. Though there was acute awareness that the knowledge base that inspired the early projects was very weak, it was felt to be necessary, indeed unavoidable, that action, based on what little was known at that time, be started at once.

Regardless of motivation, Community Managed Forests empirically conserve forests, meta-analysis proves Porter-Bolland et al 11 

Among the 13 CMFs where the outcome of forest conservation was explained by the QCA analysis, 12 had very low annual forest cover change rates (greater than -0.09). The exception was a case study of an extractive reserve in Brazil with a rate of annual forest cover change of -0.17. Six of the CMF case studies with forest conservation outcomes had forest cover change rates that were negligible (greater than -0.003), showing forest maintenance and even forest recovery. These CMF case studies were located in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico. The most common underlying factors among CMFs with forest conservation outcomes were the presence of conservation policies and institutions, communal land use, government ownership of land, and natural resource management. Community forest management was present in nine of the CMFs (70) and indigenous populations were also present in 50 of the CMF case studies that presented the outcome of forest conservation, which shows their relevance to conservation within CMFs in the tropics.

Advantage 1 is Disease

Deforestation exposes us to deadly diseases we are not resistant to Butler 06
Many emergent and resurgent diseases are directly linked to land alterations which bring humans in closer contact with such pathogens. For example, malaria and snailborne schistosomiasis have escalated because of the creation of artificial pools of water like dams, rice paddies, drainage ditches, irrigation canals, and puddles created by tractor treads. Malaria is a particular problem in deforested and degraded areas, though not in forested zones where there are few stagnant ground pools for mosquito breeding. These pools are most abundant in cleared regions and areas where tractors tear gashes in the earth. Malaria is already a major threat to indigenous peoples who have developed no resistance to the disease nor any access to antimalarial drugs. Malaria and alone is cited as being responsible for killing an estimated 20 percent of the Yanomani in Brazil and Venezuela. Malaria—caused by unicelluar parasites transferred in the saliva of mosquitoes when they bite—is an especially frightening disease for its drug-resistant forms. Thanks to poor prescribing techniques on the part of doctors, there are now strains in Southeast Asia reputed to be resistant to more than 20 anti-malarial drugs. There is serious concern that global climate change will affect the distribution of malaria, which currently infects roughly 270 million people worldwide and kills 1-2 million a year— 430,000-680,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa alone. The outbreak of disease in the tropics does not affect only the people of those countries, since virtually any disease can be incubated for enough time to allow penetration into the temperate developed countries.
Advantage 2 is Indigenous Peoples – Deforestation causes harms to indigenous peoples that are empirically proven Then writes

Deforestation can lead to many effects on the indigenous people. Firstly, deforestation causes them to move away from their ancestral homes. Secondly, deforestation is also associated with the loss of animals and plants that the indigenous people depend on to survive. Their traditional life-styles, customs and religious beliefs can be lost. Another great loss is their knowledge of medicine that had been passed down by their ancestors. The effect of deforestation on the indigenous people can also be seen in the Amazonian Rainforest in Brazil. There are now less than 200,000 indigenous peoples Indians left here. If this carries on, their population will dwindle further to an alarming level.

Advantage 3 is Warming – Deforestation is the main cause of warming Howden 07 

The accelerating destruction of the rainforests that form a precious cooling band around the Earth's equator, is now being recognised as one of the main causes of climate change. Carbon emissions from deforestation far outstrip damage caused by planes and automobiles and factories. The rampant slashing and burning of tropical forests is second only to the energy sector as a source of greenhouses gases according to report published today by the Oxford-based Global Canopy Programme, an alliance of leading rainforest scientists. Figures from the GCP, summarising the latest findings from the United Nations, and building on estimates contained in the Stern Report, show deforestation accounts for up to 25 per cent of global emissions of heat-trapping gases, while transport and industry account for 14 per cent each; and aviation makes up only 3 per cent of the total. "Tropical forests are the elephant in the living room of climate change," said Andrew Mitchell, the head of the GCP. Scientists say one days' deforestation is equivalent to the carbon footprint of eight million people flying to New York. Reducing those catastrophic emissions can be achieved most quickly and most cheaply by halting the destruction in Brazil, Indonesia, the Congo and elsewhere. No new technology is needed, says the GCP, just the political will and a system of enforcement and incentives that makes the trees worth more to governments and individuals standing than felled. "The focus on technological fixes for the emissions of rich nations while giving no incentive to poorer nations to stop burning the standing forest means we are putting the cart before the horse," said Mr Mitchell.

Warming is rising and it means extinction – there is no question I have 100 probability Publius 13 

For a reason I’ll discuss next time, if global warming is man-made — and few unbought scientists think otherwise — then 3°C warming may well be just the halfway point to the full disaster. By that I mean, because of the way the socio-political process works, the “never stop burning carbon” scenario could easily take us right past 3°C to a 7°C (12½°F) warmer world — in the worst case, by 2100 — and perhaps beyond. That’s double the compression of Hansen’s 3°C scenario — it means 3°C warmer by the mid-2050s and 7°C warmer by the end of the century. The discussion of that outcome is also in the IPCC literature, the same literature Hansen used to make his mass-extinction prediction. This is their own worst-case scenario. It’s not a prediction, but it’s one of the possibilities. Yikes. For a look at times when the earth was as hot as 7°C above pre-Industrial norms, you have to look at the Mesozoic Era a period of great extinction and earlier (again, see the second chart above). In a 7°C warmer world, I’m not sure we’ aren’t a species. I’m not sure what it would take to exist even in the ice-free Arctic, much less live in a “civilized” way. I’ll expand that consideration next time. So the second bottom line is this — If mankind’s carbon is driving the warming process, the process doesn’t stop until man does

Underview 1: The Ethical framework is util.

The ultimate human good is happiness. Darwish 09
Let’s start with knowledge. It is clear that those who value knowledge for its own sake (for instance, highly motivated professionals) find pleasure in both the pursuit and attainment of knowledge, however exhausted they become in either case. So, granted that knowledge, for them, is a value that has intrinsic worth in itself, and is thus sought for itself, it is a value that yields their pleasure or happiness. The same can be said about the other values. Let’s take autonomy in the sense expressed by Hooker as “control over one’s own life” as another example. Here one needs to say no more than that the mere fact that people seek autonomy explains the satisfaction or the pleasure autonomy brings. Those who value autonomy, thus seek it for itself, cannot feel happy when their decisions are not in their hands, or when they do not have control over their own life. In short, they cannot be happy otherwise. Moore, who explicitly differs from the classical utilitarians in holding that pleasure is not the sole good, 20 says that “the most valuable things… are pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects,” 21 which seems to mean that such things are valued for the pleasures and the enjoyment they bring. These examples clearly show that though these values have intrinsic worth, they bring or constitute our pleasure.  

Thus the standard is maximizing life. Prefer this standard for three additional reasons
First, the state exists because citizens willingly give it a monopoly on coercive force and sustain it by participating in its society, thus its purpose and fundamental obligation is to maximize its citizen’s rights. Deontological theory would paralyze all state action because of the infinite constraints on preventing it from function. While it may be useful in evaluating interpersonal obligations, deontological theory is incapable of guiding governmental actions making it useless for morality since morality is inherently an ethical guide to action
Second, Maximizing life comes prior to any other ethical evaluation Rasmussen
In so far as one chooses, regardless of the choice, one must choose (value) man's life. It makes no sense to value some X without also valuing that which makes the valuing of X possible : notice that this is different from saying "that which makes X possible"). If one lets X be equivalent to "death" or "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," one is able to have such a valuation only because of the precondition of being a living being. Given that life is a necessary condition for valuation, there is no other way we can value something without also (implicitly at least) valuing life.that which makes valuation possible.
Third, Any discussion of ethics necessitates util because the definition of morality is util. Lucretius
So far, so good. Regardless of the validity of their data, Greene et al. have stayed within the boundary of experimental science. In a later study, however, they went further2. This time they employed a different moral dilemma: Should one smother a crying baby to death to protect the lives of many when enemy soldiers are approaching? Here they compared the activation patterns in the brains between those who approve (utilitarians) and those who do not (deontologists). For those new to philosophical jargon, utilitarians believe that morality is a matter of promoting the greater good, while deontologists argue that there are absolute moral principles that can never be violated regardless of the consequences. Hence according to utilitarians, one should kill the baby to save everyone else, but according to deontologists, one should not, since murder is simply wrong. Greene et al. observed greater activity in brain regions associated with emotion when subjects disapprove of baby killing in this case, and greater activity in brain regions associated with “cognitive control” when utilitarian judgments prevail. For example, Cognitive control processes, moreover, can work against the social-emotional response, resulting in more utilitarian judgments--greater tendency for baby smothering. In the one brain region (right anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), activity increases for participants who made the utilitarian choice, but decreases for those who made the non-utilitarian judgment. Again, emotions drive individuals to reject choices that, while violating moral principles, result in more aggregate welfare. The shock comes from the conclusion drawn by these authors: “The social-emotional responses that we’ve inherited from our primate ancestors…undergird the absolute prohibitions that are central to deontology. In contrast, the ‘moral calculus’ that defines utilitarianism is made possible by more recently evolved structures in the frontal lobes that support abstract thinking and high-level cognitive control.” To put it bluntly, the old emotional brain represents the view of the deontologists, who believe in universal rules of morality, whereas the new rational brain embodies the utilitarian view2.  At this point, the vigilant reader can already detect some bias surfacing in the interpretation of the data. According to Greene et al., there are two sets of brain structures in competition when humans make moral decisions-the old emotional brain regions and the new rational brain regions. The form of the argument, of course, is not new, but in place of the traditional dichotomy of reason and emotion we now have “areas associated with cognitive control and working memory,” and “areas associated with emotion.” The benefit of this transformation is the ability to use an evolutionary argument regarding the brain areas. And the reasoning goes something like this: Because the old emotional brain was evolved to deal only with the personal situation, it is ill-equipped to do the moral calculus, weighing costs and benefits and choosing the action that yields the highest aggregate welfare. For such advanced cognition, the more newly evolved brain areas must be recruited.

Fourth, Utilitarianism is the only epistemically accessible theory to governments. Goodin 

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices.

Underview 2 is Theory:

Case outweighs theory. Students’ analyzing environmental issues is critical for sustainable solutions. This must be coupled with policy advocacy to succeed.
Cotgrave and Alkhaddar 06  
Environmental education  Many writers have determined that the main aim of environmental education is to change attitudes, that will in turn change behaviour. As long ago as 1976, Ramsey and Rickson identified that it has long been known that the basis for many environmental problems is irresponsible behaviour. Without a doubt, one of the most important influences on behaviour is attitude, that in turn is influenced by education. Campbell Bradley et al. (1999) stress the need for trying to change young people’s environmental attitudes because young people ultimately will be affected by, and will need to provide, solutions to environmental problems arising from present day actions. As future policymakers, the youth of today will be responsible for ‘fixing’ the environment and they will be the ones who must be persuaded to act now in order to avoid paying a high price to repair damage to the environment in the future, if indeed it is repairable. Therefore it appears that effective environmental education, which changes the attitudes of young people, is crucial. The (then) Department for Education (DFE) report, commonly known as the ‘Toyne Report’ (DFE, 1993), concluded that as education seeks to lead opinion, it will do so more effectively if it keeps in mind the distinctive nature of its mission, which is first and foremost to improve its students’ understanding. Their concern may well be awakened as a result; but it must be a properly informed concern. This does not necessarily mean treating the environment as a purely scientific issue, but does mean that the respective roles of science and ethics need to be distinguished, and the complexities of each need to be acknowledged. Failure to do this may lead all too readily to an ‘environmentalism’ which, by depicting possibilities as certainties, can only discredit itself in the long run and feed the complacency which it seeks to dispel. McKeown-Ice and Dendinger (2000) have identified the fact that scientific knowledge and political intervention will not solve the environmental problem on their own, thus implying that something additional is required to change behaviour. As has already been discussed, behaviour changes can only occur if attitudes change and this can be achieved through education. As Fien (1997) identifies, environmental education can play a key role by creating awareness, and changing people’s values, skills and behaviour. Introducing environmental elements into the curriculum can therefore be seen as a potentially effective way of transferring knowledge. This should in turn improve attitudes that will lead to improvements in environmental behaviour. Graham (2000) believes that it is crucial that building professionals not only participate in the creation of projects that have low environmental impact, but equally it is important that they learn to conceive, nurture, promote and facilitate the kind of paradigm changes seen as necessary to create a sustainable society. There are however limitations as to what education can achieve on its own, for as Jucker (2002) believes, if we do not do everything we can to transform our political, economic and social systems into more sustainable structures, we might as well forget the educational part.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism.
Nelson 8 writes
And the truth-statement model of the resolution imposes an absolute burden of proof on the affirmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the af?rmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the af?rmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the af?rmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is suf?cient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ?nd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.
If the negative need only prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, such strategies seem fundamentally unfair, as they provide the negative with functionally in?nite ground, as there are a nearly in?nite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the af?rmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.
Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of Under competing world-views rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the negative retains equal flexibility while being denied access to those skeptical arguments indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.
Such a model of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer their worldview, thereby further enforcing a parallel burden structure. This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate the truth of ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world. They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

  Janaki R. R. Alavalapati (Assistant Professor of School of Forest Resources and Conservation, University of Florida) and Wiktor L. Adamowicz (Professor in the Department of Rural Economy, University of Alberta. He received his Ph.D. from University of Minnesota. His research interests are environmental economics and valuation, forest economics, and econometrics.). “Tourism Impact Modeling for Resource Extraction Regions.” Annals of Tourism Research. Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 188-202. 1999.
http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/seagrant/ClimateChangeWhiteboard/Resources/Mac2/tourism20impact20modeling.pdf
  Google map reveals the devastating rate of deforestation across the globe Maps show how forests experienced an overall loss of 1.5 million sq km For comparison, this is equal to the size to the entire state of Alaska Deforestation in the Amazon increased by nearly a third over the past year Meanwhile, Indonesia's deforestation rate doubled in the study period By ELLIE ZOLFAGHARIFARD PUBLISHED: 09:03 EST, 15 November 2013 | UPDATED: 12:41 EST, 16 November 2013
  The Center For Tropical Conservation Duke University Communities And Sustainable Forestry In Developing Countries May 1004 William Ascher Center for International Development Research Sanford Institute of Public Policy
  Prepared by J. E. M. Arnold FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Rome, 1992 CF Note 7: Community Forestry: Ten Years in Review
  Community Managed Forests and forest protected areas: an assessment of their conservation effectiveness across the tropics Luciana Porter-Bolland 2011 Methodology: We conducted a meta-analysis of published empirical case studies that assessed forest cover change in tropical environments either under PA status or CMF. http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/articles/AGuariguata1101.pdf
  Rhett Butler Co-founder Tropical Conservation Science and information source for CNN, National Geographic, author of Rainforests and Co-authoer of Bottom up Conservation “Loss of Species for Forest Regeneration” (2006 January 9) http://rainforests.mongabay.com/0904.htm
  Stephen Then. (24/09/2003). Longhouse folks affected by bakun project seek help. The Star. http://library.thinkquest.org/07aug/00720/eflossofindigenoustribes(ef).html
  “Deforestation: The Hidden Cause Of Global Warming”, deputy foreign editor of The Independent, (http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/deforestation-the-hidden-cause-of-global-warming-448734.html) Daniel Howden 2007
  Global Warming: We are halfway to a mass extinction event 5/10/2013 10:00am by Gaius Publius Americablog
  Bahaa Darwish (Qatar University). “Rethinking Utilitarianism,” Teaching Ethics 10 (1):87-109 (2009). http://www.uvu.edu/ethics/seac/Darwish20-20Rethinking20Utilitarianism.pdf
  Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, Professors of Philosophy, Bellarmine College and St. John's University, READING NOZICK, Jeffrey Paul, ed., 1981, p245. (PDNSS1794)
  Lucretius, “Does Neuroscience Refute Ethics,” August 24, 2005, Ludwig von Mises Institute. The Greene et al. study is a study on 41 participants. The results ALL had p values less than 0.05 AT LEAST, as some had p values even lower than 0.005. This means the null hypothesis is rejected and the chance of this correlation happening merely by chance is less than 5 making the results statistically significant according to currently agreed upon convention. THIS IS BEYOND LEGIT! (Citation for Greene et al. study: “The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment,” Neuron, Vol. 44, 389-400, Oct. 14, 2004, Joshua D. Greene,1,2,* Leigh E. Nystrom,1,2Andrew D. Engell,1,2John M. Darley,1and Jonathan D. Cohen1,2 1Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Center for the Study of Brain, Princeton University)
  (Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)
  Alison Cotgrave has a PhD in Sustainability Literacy, she is currently the Deputy Director of the School of the Built Environment and a researcher in construction education, she is also a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, Rafid Alkhaddar has a PhD in Civil Engineering and currently teaches at the School of the Built Environment John Moores University in Liverpool as a Professor of Water and Environmental Engineering (March 2006, “Greening the Curricula within Construction Programmes,” Journal for Education in the Built Environment, Vol.1, Issue 1, March 2006 pp. 3-29, http://131.251.248.49/jebe/pdf/AlisonCotgrave1(1).pdf
  Adam F. Nelson, J.D.1. Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate. 2008.
  Bostrom, Nick (Existentialist of a different sort). “Moral uncertainty – toward a solution?” 1 January 2009. http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html
  Protecting environment key to ending poverty, finds UN High Level Panel 30 May 2013 Gemma Parkes, WWF International, gparkes@wwfint.org, +41 79 253 6386
  This document can be cited as Emeka Polycarp Amechi, ‘Linking Environmental Protection and Poverty Reduction in Africa: An Analysis of the Regional Legal Responses to Environmental Protection’, 6/2 Law, Environment and Development Journal (2010), p. 112, available at http://www.lead-journal.org/content/10112.pdf
  Fareed, Editor of Newsweek International whose column appears in Newsweek, Newsweek International and The Washington Post, “A Threat Worse than Terror,” 10-31, Newsweek, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/newsweek/103105.html
  Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution John D., “Biological weapons: A plague upon all houses,” Foreign Policy, Dec 22
  (Jayeola Omotola Abiola is an Undergraduate, Department of Forestry and Wildlife Management, College of Environmental Resources Management, University of Agriculture, P.M.B. 2240, AbeoLuta, Ogun State, Nigeria. “FORESTRY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD THE 21st CENTURY” http://www.fao.org/forestry/docrep/wfcxi/publi/V8/Ee/V8E_E1.HTM)
  Potential carbon mitigatiON AND INCOME IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES John O Niles, Sandra Brown, Jules Pretty, Andrew S Ball, John Fay 2002 The Royal Society http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/360/1797/1621.full.pdf
  updated 28 October 2013 Climate Change – The Science WNA http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Energy-and-Environment/Climate-Change~-~--the-science/
   (Terry L. Deibel, professor of IR at National War College, Foreign Affairs Strategy, “Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2”)

Tournament: VBT | Round: Triples | Opponent: Manan SHAHAHAHAHAHA | Judge: torson amestoy legried
Same AC Framework as the last Ethics of Care Aff. Here is the offense:

Contention One is that - Caring for others requires environmental protection. This is based on the best definition of care.
Sander-Staudt 11 writes
Because it depends upon contextual considerations, care is notoriously difficult to define. As Ruddick points out, at least three distinct but overlapping meanings of care have emerged in recent decades—an ethic defined in opposition to justice, a kind of labor, and a particular relationship (1998, 4). However, in care ethical literature, ‘care’ is most often defined as a practice, value, disposition, or virtue, and is frequently portrayed as an overlapping set of concepts. For example, Held notes that care is a form of labor, but also an ideal that guides normative judgment and action, and she characterizes care as “clusters” of practices and values (2006, 36, 40). One of the most popular definitions of care, offered by Tronto and Bernice Fischer, construes care as “a species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment”. This definition posits care fundamentally as a practice, but Tronto further identifies four sub-elements of care that can be understood simultaneously as stages, virtuous dispositions, or goals. These sub-elements are: (1) attentiveness, a proclivity to become aware of need; (2) responsibility, a willingness to respond and take care of need; (3) competence, the skill of providing good and successful care; and (4) responsiveness, consideration of the position of others as they see it and recognition of the potential for abuse in care (1994, 126-136). Tronto’s definition is praised for how it admits to cultural variation and extends care beyond family and domestic spheres, but it is also criticized for being overly broad, counting nearly every human activity as care. Other definitions of care provide more precise delineations. Diemut Bubeck narrows the definitional scope of care by emphasizing personal interaction and dependency. She describes care as an emotional state, activity, or both, that is functional, and specifically involves “the meeting of needs of one person by another where face-to-face interaction between care and cared for is a crucial element of overall activity, and where the need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself” (129). Bubeck thus distinguishes care from “service”, by stipulating that “care” involves meeting the needs for others who cannot meet their needs themselves, whereas “service” involves meeting the needs of individuals who are capable of self-care. She also holds that one cannot care for oneself, and that care does not require any emotional attachment. While some care ethicists accept that care need not always have an emotional component, Bubeck’s definitional exclusion of self-care is rejected by other care ethicists who stress additional aspects of care. For example, both Maurice Hamington and Daniel Engster make room for self-care in their definitions of care, but focus more precisely on special bodily features and end goals of care (Hamington, 2004; Engster, 2007). Hamington focuses on embodiment, stating that: “care denotes an approach to personal and social morality that shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships, and affective knowledge in a manner that can only be fully understood if care’s embodied dimension is recognized. Care is committed to flourishing and growth of individuals, yet acknowledges our interconnectedness and interdependence” (2004, 3). Engster develops a “basic needs” approach to care, defining care as a practice that includes “everything we do to help individuals to meet their vital biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in society” (2007, 28). Although care is often unpaid, interpersonal, and emotional work, Engster’s definition does not exclude paid work or self-care, nor require the presence of affection or other emotion (32). Although these definitions emphasize care as a practice, not all moral theorists maintain this view of.
…
The most comprehensive articulation of care ethics as a political theory is given by Engster, who defends a need based account of moral obligation (Engster, 2007). Engster’s “minimal capability theory” is formed around two major premises—that all human beings are dependent upon others to develop their basic capabilities, and that in receiving care, individuals tacitly and logically become obliged to care for others. Engster understands care as a set of practices normatively informed by three virtues: attention, responsiveness, and respect. Defining care as everything we do to satisfy vital biological needs, develop and sustain basic capabilities, and avoid unnecessary suffering, Engster applies these goals to domestic politics, economic justice, international relations, and culture. Engster holds governments and businesses responsible for offering economic provisions in times of sickness, disability, frail old age, bad luck, and reversal of fortune, for providing protection, health care, and clean environments, and for upholding the basic rights of individuals. He calls for businesses to balance caring and commodity production by making work and care more compatible, although he surmises that the goals of care need not fully subordinate economic ends such as profitability.

Contention Two is that – Regardless of the definition of care, we have a relationship with the environment

First, the only way to ensure respect for women, is to respect nature, this means we have to acknowledge our relationships with nature Cochrane 

1:52 left

Like social ecology, ecofeminism also points to a link between social domination and the domination of the natural world. And like both deep ecology and social ecology, ecofeminism calls for a radical overhaul of the prevailing philosophical perspective and ideology of western society. However, ecofeminism is a broad church, and there are actually a number of different positions that feminist writers on the environment have taken. In this section I will review three of the most prominent. Val Plumwood offers a critique of the rationalism inherent in traditional ethics and blames this rationalism for the oppression of both women and nature. The fundamental problem with rationalism, so Plumwood claims, is its fostering of dualisms. For example, reason itself is usually presented in stark opposition to emotion. Traditional ethics, Plumwood argues, promote reason as capable of providing a stable foundation for moral argument, because of its impartiality and universalizability. Emotion, on the other hand, lacks these characteristics, and because it is based on sentiment and affection makes for shaky ethical frameworks. Plumwood claims that this dualism between reason and emotion grounds other dualisms in rationalist thought: in particularly, mind/body, human/nature and man/woman. In each case, the former is held to be superior to the latter (Plumwood, 1991). So, for Plumwood, the inferiority of both women and nature have a common source: namely, rationalism. Once this is recognized, so the argument goes, it becomes clear that simple ethical extensionism as outlined above is insufficient to resolve the domination of women and nature. After all, such extensionism is stuck in the same mainstream rationalist thought that is the very source of the problem. What is needed instead, according to Plumwood, is a challenge to rationalism itself, and thus a challenge to the dualisms it perpetuates. However, while it is perfectly possible to acknowledge the rationalism present in much mainstream ethical thinking, one can nevertheless query Plumwood’s characterization of it. After all, does rationalism necessarily promote dualisms that are responsible for the subjugation of women and nature? Such a claim would seem odd given the many rationalist arguments that have been put forward to promote the rights and interests of both women and the natural world. In addition, many thinkers would argue that rationalist thought is not the enemy, but instead the best hope for securing proper concern for the environment and for women. For as we have seen above, such thinkers believe that relying on the sentiments and feelings of individuals is too unstable a foundation upon which to ground a meaningful ethical framework. Karen J. Warren has argued that the dualisms of rationalist thought, as outlined by Plumwood, are not in themselves problematic. Rather, Warren claims that they become problematic when they are used in conjunction with an “oppressive conceptual framework” to justify subordination. Warren argues that one feature inherent within an oppressive conceptual framework is the “logic of domination”. Thus, a list of the differences between humans and nature, and between men and women, is not in itself harmful. But once with assumptions are added, such as these the differences leading to the moral superiority of humans and of men, then we move closer to the claim that we are justifyed in subordinating women and nature on the basis of their inferiority. According to Warren, just such a logic of domination has been prevalent within western society. Men have been identified with the realm of the “mental” and “human”, while women have been identified with the “physical” and the “natural”. Once it is claimed that the “natural” and the “physical” are is morally inferior to the “human” and “mental”, men become justified in subordinating women and nature. For Warren then, feminists and environmentalists share the same goal: namely, to abolish this oppressive conceptual framework (Warren, 1990).

Second, are dependent on the environment Nigel :

For Heidegger the world is not comprised of a set of distinct objects but is comprised of the totality of the things in the world, humans included. As such, no one thing is separate from other things in the world, but parts of a greater whole. It is the relations between things-in-the-world, and not just the fact that these things exist, that are world building. Furthermore, things-in-the-world as relational beings point to other things-in-the-world. In short, everything that comprises our world and that has meaning to us as a tool to further our own projects, can be taken as a sign that allows us to understand the being of the world, and our own Being. When we recognize these tools as signs and pay attention to that which they signify, we can “see” beyond the merely apparent. The hammer’s handle is not just a tooled piece of wood, but is the product of a long process that started with a tree that was felled and removed from its environment. If we think a little deeper, we can come to recognize that without the environment that from which this tree came that we would not be able to do the things that we are presently involved. By thinking in this way we may come to realize that we are not removed from the environment, a subject over and above the object that is the “environment”, but dependent upon it in a way that is integral to the understanding of our own Being. In sum, if we are interested in the question of our own Being then the environment as revealed by the tools we use becomes a part of our concern. Of course, this does not necessarily entail that our concern for our environment will be anything beyond a realization of our dependency on an environment. However, it may provide a way on which an environmental ethic could be built

Contention Three is that in empirical manifestations - Sustainable Development ensures landscapes are cared for. In the status quo, resources are extracted without concern for the environmental harms creating an uncared for landscape which contrasts with cared for ones where we try to protect the land Olson :

In many parts of the world today, communities under economic pressure are sacrificing one part of their environmental capital in order to build up another. Drawing examples from Madagascar, we describe the conditions under which people choose to invest or disinvest in their landscapes. The island of Madagascar was once wholly clothed in forests of fabulous diversity. After 1500 years of human occupation, less than one- fifth of the forest is left, and a pattern has emerged, as it has across Africa and Latin America, of strong contrasts between "cared- for" and "uncared-for" landscapes. Youthful, fast-growing, hard working populations, in the attempt to develop new means of subsistence, have neglected, burned, inundated or undermined other areas, or abandoned them to erosion by wind and water

Alasdair Cochrane Email: A.D.Cochrane@lse.ac.uk London School of Economics and Political Science United Kingdom
   “Heidegger and Environmental Philosophy” - Nigel of the Free Soil Rveiew, July 18 2010 - http://thefsreview.wordpress.com/2010/07/18/heidegger-and-environmental-philosophy/
  Maureen Sander-Staudt. “Care Ethics.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011. http://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/

Environments as Shock Absorbers, Examples from Madagascar Author(s): Sherry Olson Source: Environmental Review: ER, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter, 1988), pp. 61-80

Tournament: VBT | Round: Triples | Opponent: Manan SHAHAHAHAHAHA | Judge: torson amestoy legried
Same AC Framework as the last Ethics of Care Aff. Here is the offense:

Contention One is that - Caring for others requires environmental protection. This is based on the best definition of care.
Sander-Staudt 11 writes
Because it depends upon contextual considerations, care is notoriously difficult to define. As Ruddick points out, at least three distinct but overlapping meanings of care have emerged in recent decades—an ethic defined in opposition to justice, a kind of labor, and a particular relationship (1998, 4). However, in care ethical literature, ‘care’ is most often defined as a practice, value, disposition, or virtue, and is frequently portrayed as an overlapping set of concepts. For example, Held notes that care is a form of labor, but also an ideal that guides normative judgment and action, and she characterizes care as “clusters” of practices and values (2006, 36, 40). One of the most popular definitions of care, offered by Tronto and Bernice Fischer, construes care as “a species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment”. This definition posits care fundamentally as a practice, but Tronto further identifies four sub-elements of care that can be understood simultaneously as stages, virtuous dispositions, or goals. These sub-elements are: (1) attentiveness, a proclivity to become aware of need; (2) responsibility, a willingness to respond and take care of need; (3) competence, the skill of providing good and successful care; and (4) responsiveness, consideration of the position of others as they see it and recognition of the potential for abuse in care (1994, 126-136). Tronto’s definition is praised for how it admits to cultural variation and extends care beyond family and domestic spheres, but it is also criticized for being overly broad, counting nearly every human activity as care. Other definitions of care provide more precise delineations. Diemut Bubeck narrows the definitional scope of care by emphasizing personal interaction and dependency. She describes care as an emotional state, activity, or both, that is functional, and specifically involves “the meeting of needs of one person by another where face-to-face interaction between care and cared for is a crucial element of overall activity, and where the need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself” (129). Bubeck thus distinguishes care from “service”, by stipulating that “care” involves meeting the needs for others who cannot meet their needs themselves, whereas “service” involves meeting the needs of individuals who are capable of self-care. She also holds that one cannot care for oneself, and that care does not require any emotional attachment. While some care ethicists accept that care need not always have an emotional component, Bubeck’s definitional exclusion of self-care is rejected by other care ethicists who stress additional aspects of care. For example, both Maurice Hamington and Daniel Engster make room for self-care in their definitions of care, but focus more precisely on special bodily features and end goals of care (Hamington, 2004; Engster, 2007). Hamington focuses on embodiment, stating that: “care denotes an approach to personal and social morality that shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships, and affective knowledge in a manner that can only be fully understood if care’s embodied dimension is recognized. Care is committed to flourishing and growth of individuals, yet acknowledges our interconnectedness and interdependence” (2004, 3). Engster develops a “basic needs” approach to care, defining care as a practice that includes “everything we do to help individuals to meet their vital biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in society” (2007, 28). Although care is often unpaid, interpersonal, and emotional work, Engster’s definition does not exclude paid work or self-care, nor require the presence of affection or other emotion (32). Although these definitions emphasize care as a practice, not all moral theorists maintain this view of.
…
The most comprehensive articulation of care ethics as a political theory is given by Engster, who defends a need based account of moral obligation (Engster, 2007). Engster’s “minimal capability theory” is formed around two major premises—that all human beings are dependent upon others to develop their basic capabilities, and that in receiving care, individuals tacitly and logically become obliged to care for others. Engster understands care as a set of practices normatively informed by three virtues: attention, responsiveness, and respect. Defining care as everything we do to satisfy vital biological needs, develop and sustain basic capabilities, and avoid unnecessary suffering, Engster applies these goals to domestic politics, economic justice, international relations, and culture. Engster holds governments and businesses responsible for offering economic provisions in times of sickness, disability, frail old age, bad luck, and reversal of fortune, for providing protection, health care, and clean environments, and for upholding the basic rights of individuals. He calls for businesses to balance caring and commodity production by making work and care more compatible, although he surmises that the goals of care need not fully subordinate economic ends such as profitability.

Contention Two is that – Regardless of the definition of care, we have a relationship with the environment

First, the only way to ensure respect for women, is to respect nature, this means we have to acknowledge our relationships with nature Cochrane 

1:52 left

Like social ecology, ecofeminism also points to a link between social domination and the domination of the natural world. And like both deep ecology and social ecology, ecofeminism calls for a radical overhaul of the prevailing philosophical perspective and ideology of western society. However, ecofeminism is a broad church, and there are actually a number of different positions that feminist writers on the environment have taken. In this section I will review three of the most prominent. Val Plumwood offers a critique of the rationalism inherent in traditional ethics and blames this rationalism for the oppression of both women and nature. The fundamental problem with rationalism, so Plumwood claims, is its fostering of dualisms. For example, reason itself is usually presented in stark opposition to emotion. Traditional ethics, Plumwood argues, promote reason as capable of providing a stable foundation for moral argument, because of its impartiality and universalizability. Emotion, on the other hand, lacks these characteristics, and because it is based on sentiment and affection makes for shaky ethical frameworks. Plumwood claims that this dualism between reason and emotion grounds other dualisms in rationalist thought: in particularly, mind/body, human/nature and man/woman. In each case, the former is held to be superior to the latter (Plumwood, 1991). So, for Plumwood, the inferiority of both women and nature have a common source: namely, rationalism. Once this is recognized, so the argument goes, it becomes clear that simple ethical extensionism as outlined above is insufficient to resolve the domination of women and nature. After all, such extensionism is stuck in the same mainstream rationalist thought that is the very source of the problem. What is needed instead, according to Plumwood, is a challenge to rationalism itself, and thus a challenge to the dualisms it perpetuates. However, while it is perfectly possible to acknowledge the rationalism present in much mainstream ethical thinking, one can nevertheless query Plumwood’s characterization of it. After all, does rationalism necessarily promote dualisms that are responsible for the subjugation of women and nature? Such a claim would seem odd given the many rationalist arguments that have been put forward to promote the rights and interests of both women and the natural world. In addition, many thinkers would argue that rationalist thought is not the enemy, but instead the best hope for securing proper concern for the environment and for women. For as we have seen above, such thinkers believe that relying on the sentiments and feelings of individuals is too unstable a foundation upon which to ground a meaningful ethical framework. Karen J. Warren has argued that the dualisms of rationalist thought, as outlined by Plumwood, are not in themselves problematic. Rather, Warren claims that they become problematic when they are used in conjunction with an “oppressive conceptual framework” to justify subordination. Warren argues that one feature inherent within an oppressive conceptual framework is the “logic of domination”. Thus, a list of the differences between humans and nature, and between men and women, is not in itself harmful. But once with assumptions are added, such as these the differences leading to the moral superiority of humans and of men, then we move closer to the claim that we are justifyed in subordinating women and nature on the basis of their inferiority. According to Warren, just such a logic of domination has been prevalent within western society. Men have been identified with the realm of the “mental” and “human”, while women have been identified with the “physical” and the “natural”. Once it is claimed that the “natural” and the “physical” are is morally inferior to the “human” and “mental”, men become justified in subordinating women and nature. For Warren then, feminists and environmentalists share the same goal: namely, to abolish this oppressive conceptual framework (Warren, 1990).

Second, are dependent on the environment Nigel :

For Heidegger the world is not comprised of a set of distinct objects but is comprised of the totality of the things in the world, humans included. As such, no one thing is separate from other things in the world, but parts of a greater whole. It is the relations between things-in-the-world, and not just the fact that these things exist, that are world building. Furthermore, things-in-the-world as relational beings point to other things-in-the-world. In short, everything that comprises our world and that has meaning to us as a tool to further our own projects, can be taken as a sign that allows us to understand the being of the world, and our own Being. When we recognize these tools as signs and pay attention to that which they signify, we can “see” beyond the merely apparent. The hammer’s handle is not just a tooled piece of wood, but is the product of a long process that started with a tree that was felled and removed from its environment. If we think a little deeper, we can come to recognize that without the environment that from which this tree came that we would not be able to do the things that we are presently involved. By thinking in this way we may come to realize that we are not removed from the environment, a subject over and above the object that is the “environment”, but dependent upon it in a way that is integral to the understanding of our own Being. In sum, if we are interested in the question of our own Being then the environment as revealed by the tools we use becomes a part of our concern. Of course, this does not necessarily entail that our concern for our environment will be anything beyond a realization of our dependency on an environment. However, it may provide a way on which an environmental ethic could be built

Contention Three is that in empirical manifestations - Sustainable Development ensures landscapes are cared for. In the status quo, resources are extracted without concern for the environmental harms creating an uncared for landscape which contrasts with cared for ones where we try to protect the land Olson :

In many parts of the world today, communities under economic pressure are sacrificing one part of their environmental capital in order to build up another. Drawing examples from Madagascar, we describe the conditions under which people choose to invest or disinvest in their landscapes. The island of Madagascar was once wholly clothed in forests of fabulous diversity. After 1500 years of human occupation, less than one- fifth of the forest is left, and a pattern has emerged, as it has across Africa and Latin America, of strong contrasts between "cared- for" and "uncared-for" landscapes. Youthful, fast-growing, hard working populations, in the attempt to develop new means of subsistence, have neglected, burned, inundated or undermined other areas, or abandoned them to erosion by wind and water

Alasdair Cochrane Email: A.D.Cochrane@lse.ac.uk London School of Economics and Political Science United Kingdom
   “Heidegger and Environmental Philosophy” - Nigel of the Free Soil Rveiew, July 18 2010 - http://thefsreview.wordpress.com/2010/07/18/heidegger-and-environmental-philosophy/
  Maureen Sander-Staudt. “Care Ethics.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011. http://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/

Environments as Shock Absorbers, Examples from Madagascar Author(s): Sherry Olson Source: Environmental Review: ER, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter, 1988), pp. 61-80

Tournament: Stanford | Round: 3 | Opponent: Presentation SP | Judge: Matt Delateur
I value morality because the resolution implies a moral obligation from the word should in the context of LD debate. Presume aff—side bias—there is a 6 neg side bias, so if the debate is equal the aff has technically done a better job. (sample size 30,000 rounds fantasy debate) 

Part 1 is - Practical Reason is true. Three warrants:

1. Motivational Internalism: Since morality is a guide for action  it has to motivate action or else it would be worthless. Katsafanas 11 :
   First, there is ... direction of internalism.
   And only reasons do this. Practical reason motivates people and provides universal maxims by which to act. Engstrom 09
   Whereas theoretical knowledge ... with the will (G 412) 

2. Infinite Regress: Practical reason is the only possible source of moral obligations for there is no escape from the inherent authority of reason. Velleman 06 introduces us to Kant
2006. Cambridge University Press. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS* J. David Velleman University of Michigan
As we have seen,... reason to act for reasons.

3. Action Theory: Action theory precedes ethics. We need a basic account of what an action is before ethics can be sound. Anscombe 58 writes  AT
That I owe the...concepts is required. 

This justifies practical reason. Unity of action can only be explained by reason, not desire. Rodl 2k writes  AT
Calculation from desire ... be doing B.

Once we assume a discussion of a rational agent, the subjective desires and objective desires of an agent intersect, relieving the problem of subjectivity and providing us universal maxims with which to guide Engstrom 09 

As we saw, ... which it applies. 

This implies that all ethical reasoning is the same and leads us to conclude that ethical theories are about universalizable maxims.

Thus the standard is consistency with universal maxims. Prefer this for two additional reasons

1. In acting for reasons we confer value upon ourselves which requires us to equally respect all rational agents as ends-in-themselves as well. Watkins 02:

Eric Watkins Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego and William Fitzpatrick Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech.  O’Neill and Korsgaard on the Construction of Normativity . The Journal of Value Inquiry 36: 349–367, 2002. 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. http://www.springerlink.com/content/4b9e64tdfr1nh9x7/fulltext.pdf

Since we are ... own rational agency.

And, this means the AC standard is a logical prerequisite to any system of ethics because we must first recognize the inherent value of rational beings in order to recognize any other form of value.
2. Rejecting individuals’ right to outer freedom against coercion is rationally contradictory. Engstrom 96:

Stephen Engstrom Stephen Engstrom is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. Before coming to the University of Pittsburgh in 1990, he taught at the University of Chicago and at Harvard. His areas of interest include ethics, metaphysics, modern philosophy (especially Kant), and ancient philosophy. He is co-editor (with Jennifer Whiting) of Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty (Cambridge, 1996); and has published articles on Kant's ethics and epistemology.. Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge.
Now on the ... that same freedom.20 

Part 3 is the Offense I contend that destroying the environment isn’t a universal maxim.
Sub-point A is the original community of land.
Environmental protection is a material prerequisite to a system of equal freedom.
Ataner 12  writes
Brackets in original. My second line ... (as a matter of Virtue).
Sub-point B is property rights.
A system of equal freedom would protect property rights, requiring environmental protection of owned land. Ataner 12 writes
Now, at this stage... maintained in perpetuity.
Environmental damage of un-owned land is a unilateral assertion of property rights which kills equal freedom.
Ataner 12 writes
A thorough response ... acquired rights in it).

Part 4 is the Ethical Underview

The fundamental basis of the state must involve consistency, because if states can act arbitrarily rights become meaningless, and the state no longer fulfills its role as a fair arbitrator of rights conflicts. Chambers 09:

Chambers (Department of Political Science @ the University of Toronto) “Who Shall Judge? Hobbes, Locke, and Kant on the Construction of Public Reason” Ethics and Global Politics 2009
All law and ... everyone wants it.

Act Omission Distinction is true Hope
First is the ... of my own life. 

Put away Cummiskey. My notion of value precludes aggregation.
Korsgaard 93 writes  AT
According to Intersubjectivism, ... an Intersubjectivist will not be a consequentialist.

 http://fantasydebate.com/ld-national-statistics/
  Descriptively to refer to some codes of conduct put forward by a society or, some other group, such as a religion, or accepted by an individual for her own behavior. SEP Definition of Morality.
 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXIII No. 3, November 2011, Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism paul katsafanas Boston University
  Stephen Engstrom. “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge.” 2009.
  G.E.M. Anscombe. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 124 (Jan., 1958), pp. 1-19 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy.
  Rödl, Sebastian. Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2000
  Engstrom, Stephen. Form of Practical Knowledge : A Study of the Categorical Imperative. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 2009. p 141. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/uscisd/Doc?id=10399445andppg=141 Copyright © 2009. Harvard University Press. All rights reserved.

  Kant on Environmental Protection Attila Ataner BAJD October 2012 McMaster University
  J Med Ethics 2000;26:227-228 doi:10.1136/jme.26.4.227 Editorial.  Acts and omissions revisited Tony Hope
  Korsgaard, Christine.  Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. “The reasons we can share: An attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values.” Cambridge University Press, 1993. Previously published in Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 1: 24-51. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3196321/Korsgaard_ReasonsShare.pdf?sequence=2
  Korsgaard, Christine M. 2008. Taking the law into our own hands: Kant on the right to revolution. In The Constitution of Agency, 233-262. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, eds. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Tournament: jan feb 2013 | Round: 2 | Opponent: many | Judge: many
See Sacred Heart AT and Westwood AG not hockaday AG
I have read and will read positions on their wikis.

Tournament: Glenbrook | Round: 4 | Opponent: 1 | Judge: 1
A is the interpretation – Debaters must disclose all case arguments read, that cited a different source for argumentation, on the NDCA wiki with first three and last three words of the card and the tag that were read at a tournament before the Glenbrook on the national forensics league November/December 2013 topic in LD debate before the start of the Glenbrook tournament. 

C is the standards

1. Argument integrity 

2. Clash and Argument Quality

D voter - Fairness and Education

Drop the debater

Tournament: Voices RR | Round: 1 | Opponent: Idk | Judge: Idk
Analytics not included

OH BTW I PLAN ON READING THIS UTIL FRAMEWORK FOR MY AFF AT MEADOWS SO ITS PREDICTABLE YOU SHITS.

First, the state exists because citizens willingly give it a monopoly on coercive...

Second, is no act omission distinction Vermule 

IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED?ACTS,OMISSIONS, AND LIFELIFE TRADEOFFS Cass R. Sunstein* and Adrian Vermeule 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM

In our view... or fully discourage it.
The lack of an act-omission distinction necessitates util because it forces us to view the end-state as one with the action. So, all state actions must maximize the best end state.
 Third, util is the fairest framework because:
a. Ground:

b. Predictability:

Fourth, util is the most educational framework because: a. we ought to Roleplay policy makers Shaw 

PEDAGOGY IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Using Role-Play Scenarios in the IR Classroom: An Examination of Exercises on Peacekeeping Operations and Foreign Policy Decision Making CAROLYN M. SHAW Wichita State University

The use of role-playing in... is in our ‘‘national interest.’’

And policymakers are utilitarian Goodin

  (Robert, philosopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)
 

Consider, first, the... various possible choices.

Education is key to debate because there needs to be an educational backbone to make the debates we have valuable or else the debate becomes meaningless and because the education of a round is what we hold years from this round.

Tournament: Berk | Round: 1 | Opponent: Against Negs | Judge: IDk
See Adam Tomasi's disclosure