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AFFTournament: Brandheis | Round: 1 | Opponent: not available | Judge: not available Compulsory voting, also called mandatory voting, is the legal requirement that electors vote in elections. Requirements are found in electoral laws or national constitutions, may or may not be enforced, and can be differentially applied by age group. For example all citizens 21 years and older are required to vote in Bolivia, but those 18-20 are only required to vote if they are married. Generally, voting is required of full citizens, but not of temporary residents.
Many have endorsed democracy on the basis of the proposition that democracy has beneficial effects on character. Many have noted with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on them more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. In addition, democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference whether they do or not. Finally, some have argued that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they come genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill 1861, p. 74, Elster 2002, p. 152).
a : government by the people; especially : rule of the majority It is a common observation that political representatives tend to be drawn from the elite stratum of society. Even where representatives are chosen through fair and democratic elections, it is often said that legislative assemblies remain “unrepresentative,” and, in particular, that they are under-representative of women, ethnic minorities, and the poorer and less educated social classes. This is especially true of representation at the national level. When we say that a parliament is unrepresentative of certain groups, we are referring to a concept of descriptive or demographic representation, and implying that a parliament should be a microcosm of the nation.1 To some extent at least, it should mirror the population from which it is drawn.2 The concern that legislatures be demographically representative of the diverse classes of citizens is not new. Alexander Hamilton expressed this concern in the Federalist Papers when he questioned whether a representative body composed of “landholders, merchants and men of the learned profession” could speak legitimately for all people: “It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have some of their own numbers in the representative body, in order that their feelings and interests may be better understood and attended to.”3 Yet, over the last ten or so years, there has been growing concern within democratic societies with the facial composition of representative assemblies. It has become increasingly important that parties and legislatures be (or appear to be) inclusive and demographically representative of the broader society. Of special concern have been two underrepresented groups, women and ethnic minorities. Equality, particularly political equality, means that all citizens are treated as equals in the political process (Dahl, 1956, 1998), and that all citizens must have equal access to political power (Saward, 1998). Thus, the rather abstract principle of equality leads to a more concrete feature of democratic governance: full inclusion of all persons subject to the legislation of a democratic state (Dahl, 1998: 75). There are at least two reasons to regard equality as a fundamental principle of democracy. First, in modern, secular societies, there is no objective basis on which to evaluate whether A's conduct of life is better than B's. Second, ‘no persons are so definitely better qualified than others to govern that they should be entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of the state’ (Dahl, 1998: 75). Political equality thus aims at the equal formulation, equal consideration, and equal inclusion of all citizens’ preferences. Inclusive participation, representation, and transparency are required to reach this goal. Participation in elections is declining in most advanced industrial countries.5 Lower turnout, moreover, is more unequal turnout and these two facts, taken together, underpin the case for compulsion.6 Lower turnout seems to threaten the legitimacy of a country’s government and electoral system, because it significantly increases the likelihood that governments will reflect a minority, rather than a majority, of registered voters, and of the voting-population, itself. As Ferdinand Mount said, commenting on the report of the Power Inquiry, in Britain, ‘when little more than 20 of the electorate has voted for the winning party, as in the United Kingdom general election of May 2005, legitimacy begins to drain away’. He adds, ‘If only just over half of us bother to vote at all in national elections and scarcely a third in local elections, the bureaucracy begins to think of elections as a tiresome and increasingly insignificant interruption in its continuous exercise of power. What develops is…‘executive democracy’ and….more rudely described… “elective dictatorship”’. (Mount, 2006) It is not news that turnout has been declining in most democracies since the Second World War. However, the association of low turnout with unequal turnout may be less well known and its significance less clearly appreciated. For example, in the last two General Elections in Britain the participation gap between manual and non-manual workers more than doubled: from around 5 in 1997 to around 11 in 2005. Likewise, between the 1960s and 2005 the difference in turnout between the top and bottom quartile of earners grew from 7 to around 13.7 The results are not dissimilar in other countries, and are particularly pronounced in the United States, where turnout at presidential elections for the college educated can be over 25 higher than that of the population as a whole, while those who lack a high-school diploma are 16 less likely to vote than the general population. (Rose, 2000, 316-7) When voting gets as low as 28 per cent, democracy is endangered. This is what the conservative government realised in 1924. Low participation entrenches inequality. It threatens the legitimacy of our country's government because a low vote ensures that only a minority is represented instead of a majority. In particular, such small voter turnout fosters a mindset amongst politicians, the civil service and the business community that elections are a burden and an interruption. With a minority of society deciding the government for the majority, it is easier than ever for special interests to distort public policy. Low turnout is a problem for almost every country in the world — especially our closest cultural peers, the USA and UK. Even with rockstar candidates like Obama, participation rarely peaks about 65 per cent. Voter turnout fell from 62.3 per cent in 2008 to an estimated 57.5 per cent in 2012. What's more, the 2012 election saw unprecedented attempts by Republicans, bankrolled by conservative billionaires and multinational corporations, to suppress the vote of African Americans, Latinos and young people. Expanding the number of people who vote is not only virtuous in itself. It helps defend our democracy and ensures it is more likely to act in the interests of all the people, not a moneyed minority. While universal franchise was adopted in many democracies by the end of the nineteenth century, voter turnout has been typically low. Worse, it has secularly declined. This is particularly true in recent decades. During the last two decades, average turnout in Latin America was 71.2 percent in legislative elections and just 65.5 percent in presidential elections (Payne et. al, 2002). Even regions with the highest voting turnouts yield remarkably low participation rates. This is the case in Central and Eastern Europe, with 73 percent, and industrial countries, with 71 percent (IDEA, 1997).7 The impact of compulsory voting on voting turnout is noticeable. IDEA (1997) finds that voter turnout increases by six to seven percentage points in the 24 countries with mandatory voting countries included in their sample. This increase is even higher in Latin America. Furthermore, in a similar study, Fornos (1996) finds that voting turnout increases between 11 and 24 points. Within countries there is also compelling evidence of increased turnout. Perhaps the classic example is Australia, where voting turnout in legislative elections dramatically increased from about 64 percent to around 94 percent after mandatory voting laws were enacted in 1924 (Montinola and Jackman, 2002).8 In fact, compulsory voting has proved a far more effective instrument for achieving higher voter turnout than other available mechanisms, including simple registration rules, weekend voting, relatively infrequent elections, centralized electoral electronic voting, postal voting, and even mobile polling stations (Hill, 2002). Although mandatory voting laws have a strong impact on turnout, regardless of the level of enforcement (Liphart, 1997), some evidence suggests that the level of enforcement generates an even higher turnout. In Australia and Uruguay, countries with strong enforcement, the percentage of registered voters that participated in legislative elections is close to 90 percent and 94 percent, respectively.9 On the other hand, in Italy and Peru, countries with weak or no enforcement, the number falls to 83 percent and 73 percent, respectively.10 While voting remains compulsory, that the whole nation is obliged to go to the polls, so must the polls go – physically and practically – to the whole nation. This is why, unlike other countries, we have simple electoral enrolment procedures, voting on weekends, easily-organised postal-voting, ballot boxes in nursing homes and hospitals, an independent electoral commission, and a system that must consistently identify and remove obstacles to voting. In countries where voting is optional, even a democratic state has no such obligation to enfranchise its citizenry. That "not having enough time" to vote is the single biggest reason citizens of other Western democracies don't make it to the polls is exactly why voting is held on working days in some countries, with districts potentially hostile to a ruling party's electoral fortunes subject to extraordinary suppression efforts. In the year 2000, for example, thousands of citizens living in a democracy – most of them belonging to a racial minority – were wrongly added to a "scrub list" and were never added to voting rolls. This wasn't Croatia with its recent 20.74 turnout, but the US state of Florida during the Bush v Gore election. The controversy is rumbling on: Florida's current Republican governor has recently asked to resume a fiercely contested "voter purge" – a move which has been described as a partisan attack on Hispanic and Democratic voters. In the same vein, this week the US state of North Carolina passed "the mother of all voter suppression bills". Amongst myriad active disenfranchisements to voting, ID checks have become stricter, the early voting used by up to 70 of African-American voters in 2012 has been cut off a week early, local election boards have lost their power to keep polls open to deal with crowds, and any voter who by accident votes in the wrong precinct will have their whole vote discounted. Compulsory voting is the Australian guarantee of voter freedom, not its opposite. The law is only that you have to place a collected piece of paper into an envelope or box. You are not obliged to vote for a political party or candidate – one wag whose vote I scrutineered in an election once wrote "all the candidates are dickheads" with a big tick and walked away, fine-free. That you have the right to this is yearned for even in other democracies where mere access to a polling place is not ensured. Dinner party psephologists who bang on about how they shouldn't be obliged to turn up to the polls may do well to consider what it must be like to have fought slavery and Jim Crow laws for the right to vote, and then be denied through legal voter suppression the opportunity to exercise it.i The results provide support for the arguments laid out above. In the ?rst model (on the not interested sample), Compulsory Voting is both positive and statistically signi?cant. In countries with compulsory voting, particularly when the penalties are strictly enforced, increases the likelihood that an individual will discuss politics frequently. Predicted probabilities provide a means of facilitating a clearer understanding of how a change in compulsory voting a?ects the likelihood of frequent political discussion. With the values of all other variables ?xed at their medians, the probability that a non-interested individual will discuss political matters frequently is 0.06. When the compulsory voting laws are weakly enforced the probability is 0.08. Finally, when those laws are strictly enforced, the probability that such an individual will discuss politics frequently is 0.11. While this e?ect may not appear large at ?rst glance, the presence of strictly enforced compulsory voting laws more than doubles the likelihood that a non-interested individual will discuss politics frequently. The second model shows a di?erent story. Here Compulsory Voting is negative and is not signi?cant. Compulsory voting laws do not increase the likelihood that an individual who is interested in politics will discuss political matters more frequently. This is consistent with the expectations laid out above. These individuals are already discussing politics more frequently and they are more likely to pay the costs of gathering information through other means. The model tested in this paper is based on two assumptions. First, that compulsory voting increases the likelihood that a citizen will vote. This is not to say that everyone will vote, just that there will be greater incentives for incentives to go to the polls. Second, the majority of citizens probably prefer to vote for a party/candidate that best represents their interests at least on some dimension. Based on these two assumptions, compulsory voting should increase the incentives for citizens to seek out political information. By providing citizens with strong incentives to vote, compulsory voting will also encourage more citizens to seek out information about political matters. Because discussion is a low cost way for citizens to gain information (Downs 1957), I expect that the likelihood that citizens will engage in political discussion will be greater in countries with compulsory voting. It seems unlikely that all citizens will respond to the incentives created by compulsory voting in the same manner. Some individuals are already gathering information about political matters with a relatively higher frequency. Berent and Krosnick (1995) argue that information-gathering requires a great deal of cognitive e?ort. As a result, citizens are more likely to undertake this process if it concerns a subject that is important to them; in other words, if the subject interests them. Thus, the e?ect of compulsory voting on the frequency of political discussion should vary depending on an individual’s level of interest in politics. Individuals who are interested in politics will be less likely to respond to the incentives fostered by compulsory voting because a) they are already more likely to talk about politics and b) they are less opposed to more costly measures of information gathering. In contrast, individuals who report that they are not interested in politics should be more likely to take advantage of this relatively low information gathering technique when voting is mandatory. In addition to reducing the costs of information-gathering, political discussion has ”signi?cant consequences for the citizens who engage in it” (Mutz 2002, 111). Bennett, Flickinger, and Rhine (2000) argue that discussion is an important facet of political participation. In their analysis of the US and Britain, they ?nd citizens who discuss politics are better informed than citizens who do not, even when controlling for demographic characteristics. Their conclusions provide evidence that people who discuss politics are, in fact, increasing their political ”education” by gaining politically-relevant information that could help them to make a more informed decision. Increased discussion has been shown to be correlated with greater political sophistication (Inglehart 1977; Gastil and Dillard 1999) and a greater likelihood of engaging in other forms of political participation, particularly at the national level (Knoke 1990).
A natural question is why, once forced to vote, individuals that have more educated mothers become more polarized and take a stand in choosing a political party, while others from less-educated backgrounds do not. Do they exert more e§ort to acquire information? In Table 6, we present the results from IV regressions in which the related dependent variables are several mechanisms of information acquisition, including discussion with parents and friends and media consumption. Results for the sample with college-educated mothers are reported in Column (2). None of the related coef?cients are statistically signi?cant, indicating that neither of these variables explains the change in ideology. On the other hand, among those whose mothers do not have any college education (Column 3), the regression results indicate that, once forced to vote, they increase the consumption of political information by 1.6 days per week on the Internet. That may partly explain how they enhance their comprehension about the political spectrum. Some possible alternative explanations for why individuals from more educated families react by changing their ideological position rely on the fact that they are more knowledgeable about and involved in politics. Based on the results not shown in the paper, they follow politics more often in the media and demonstrate better performance on the political quiz. These are contributing factors for individuals as they make a decision. Alternatively, parents can be information shortcuts, providing simple advice, which, once individuals need to vote, are used to decide on a position. A compulsory voting regime could be narrowly tailored by allowing people to abstain (submitting a ballot without registering a vote), or perhaps to obtain a “conscientious objector” exemption from even submitting a ballot.74 This exemption would satisfy the requirement of narrow tailoring because it would leave open the same opportunities for expression that exist under the current system of voluntary voting.75 Such an exemption could be made available to anyone who fills out a simple form and is willing to sign a statement indicating that he or she chooses not to vote for political or religious reasons. This requirement would at least ensure that those who are not voting are doing so as a matter of political expression or religious belief and not because of the collective action problem inherent in voting.76 | 9/20/13 |
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