Tournament: Scarsdale | Round: 1 | Opponent: unknown | Judge: unknown
Ishmael CP
Util Module
TEXT: Developing countries should sponsor state-led resource extraction with high level citizen participation in the local and national decision-making process and directly distribute profits from the industry to the involved parties.
COMPETITION: The counterplan engages in resource extraction, so any permutation would A. be severance because it kicks out of the parts of their advocacy that prevent extraction and B. textually negate because they fail to prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction.
NET BENEFITS:
Public participation creates equitable redistribution.
SLACK 1
Keith Slack, 2004. Senior Policy Advisor for Oxfam America. “Sharing the Riches of the Earth: Democratizing Natural Resource-Led Development” Ethics and International Affairs
Increased public participation in revenue management can take a variety of forms, includeing direct revenue transfers to civil society groups, public review and approval of local and national budgets, and local and national discussion forums on the distribution of mineral revenues. Extracted resources have several distinctive features— they are nonrenewable; there is only one chance to use them well; they are “an endowment to society” 29 (rather than an asset produced by capital and labor); and they have serious social and environmental impacts that tend to affect adversely poor and marginalized people—which make robust public participation in decision-making regarding their management particularly appropriate. As will be discussed below in the context of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, this situation may be changing as social protest over unfair resource extraction practices has reached a point in some countries where it may be jeopardizing future foreign investment in these sectors. 28 The mid-1990s protests in the United States and Europe against Royal Dutch Shell over the execution of Nigerian human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa are perhaps one exception to this general rule. At its root, participation can be thought of as a way to address distributive justice associated with resource extraction. Indeed, theories of distributive justice evolved as a means of addressing questions concerning the conditions under which natural resources could be appropriated and used, and how inequitable access to natural resources should be addressed. In my view, distributive justice demands not only that natural resource extraction be undertaken in a manner that contributes to the overall improvement of the lives of all citizens of a country (with special weight given to the least advantaged), but also that they provide particular benefits (and compensation for harm) to individuals whose livelihoods are adversely affected by extraction activity. As noted above, in most developing countries, resource extraction takes place in areas populated by the poorest and most marginalized groups, often including indigenous peoples. Thus it is doubly appropriate for populations in extraction areas to receive special consideration in the distribution of resource rents since they are both the most impacted by extractive operations and are generally among the least advantaged persons within developing countries. The nonpoor in extraction areas should also receive a greater share of benefits than those who are comparably well off in nonextraction areas. This, however, is of little practical significance in developing countries, because the nonpoor are less likely to tolerate resource extraction activity in the areas in which they live, and thus seldom live in resource extraction areas. The poor in nonextraction areas should also receive a greater proportion of the benefits of extraction than the nonpoor in nonextraction areas. Poor populations generally suffer disproportionately from problems related to the government’s dependence on extractive revenues, such as the economic shocks to which resource-dependent economies are particularly vulnerable, and which can wipe out the poor’s modest savings.
Equitable distribution solves state failure by making things like secession politically unpalatable.
BILLON
Philippe Le Billon, 2001. Professor at the University of British Columbia with the Department of Geography and the Liu Institute for Global Issues. “The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed con?icts”
Resources can also motivate secessions in resource-rich regions. In this case, the capture of the prize does not require the control of the country but only the de facto sovereignty of the areas necessary for resource control and trade. Resources can thus greatly influence the control, transformation and production of territories. Similar to conflicts over state control, popular political agendas or more personal greed-driven initiatives can motivate secessions. The likelihood of political secession increases when ‘outsiders’ are perceived to extract ‘local’ resources without sharing the wealth, and when local populations are displaced by the extractive industry or suffer from its environmental costs. The distribution of benefits and externalities has fuelled the Biafra secession and rebellions in the Delta region of Nigeria, Aceh in Indonesia, and the Cabinda enclave in Angola, to name but a few examples of conflicts in oil-rich regions. While many of these secessions have an indigenous political base, domestic or external actors manipulating local political identities for commercial interests also motivate some. The most glaring example is that of the secession of Katanga in former Zaire. This region was first politically invented by Belgian and Anglo-Saxon interests to secure a hold on its copper mines. In the wake of independence it was used by indigenous political leaders eager to distance themselves from Kinshasa (Balancie and de La Grange, 1999; Fairhead, 2000). The fear of secession can also lead to severe repression by the central government. Southern Sudan, with its conflict over oil, grazing land, and cattle is an example of how resource control can play into seccessionist agendas (Nyot Kok, 1992; Keen, 1994). The attempt of insurgents on the island of Bougainville to secede from Papua New Guinea, was in part related to the control of copper revenues (Boge, 1998).
Public participation and civil society strengthens government.
SLACK 3
Keith Slack, 2004. Senior Policy Advisor for Oxfam America. “Sharing the Riches of the Earth: Democratizing Natural Resource-Led Development” Ethics and International Affairs
In recent years, development theorists and institutions such as the World Bank have promoted public participation in development as a key component of good governance—the effective and efficient delivery by the state of public services. The strengthening of civil society as a counterweight to the state has been an important part of the application of this theory, which began to evolve out of a realization that in many countries the malfunctioning of the state, through corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, or in other ways was itself impeding development. In 1998, World Bank president James Wolfensohn noted that participation is the “key to long-term sustainability and leverage. We must never stop reminding ourselves that it is up to the government and its people to decide what their priorities should be.”35 The application of these principles to resource revenue management, however, is much less developed, but the Bank has recently attempted to implement some of these ideas in recent high-profile resource extraction projects, most notably in the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project, which features an innovative revenue management oversight committee that includes representatives from civil society organizations. The committee is charged with monitoring the Chadian government’s use of revenues generated by the pipeline project.
Weak and failing states breed terrorism, international crime, weapons proliferation, and regional instability.
WYLER 08
Liana Sun Wyler, August 28, 2008 Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy” Congressional Research Service
Analysts identify numerous links between weak and failing states and transnational security threats, ranging from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and energy security. U.S. national security documents generally address weak states in relation to four key threat areas: (1) terrorism, (2) international crime, (3) nuclear proliferation, and (4) regional instability. Other analysts caution, however, that despite anecdotal evidence supporting a potential nexus between state weakness and today’s security threats, weak states may not necessarily harbor U.S. national security threats. Furthermore, the weakest states may not necessarily be the most significant threats to U.S. national security; relatively functional states, characterized by some elements of weakness rather than complete state collapse, may also be sites from which threats can emerge Terrorism. According to several analyses, weak and failing states are perceived as “primary bases of operations” for most U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Jaish-IMohammed. Terrorists can benefit from lax or non-existent law enforcement in these states to participate in illicit economic activities to finance their operations and ease their access to weapons and other equipment. As with Afghanistan in 2001, weak and failing states can also be ideal settings for terrorist training grounds, when the host country’s government is unable to control or govern parts of its territory. States mired in conflict also provide terrorists with opportunities to gain on-theground paramilitary experience. Researchers find, however, that not all weak states serve as safe havens for international terrorists. Terrorists have been known to exploit safe havens in nonweak as well as weak states. The Political Instability Task Force, a research group commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency, found in a 2003 report that terrorists operate in both “caves” (i.e., failed states, where militant groups can exist with impunity) and “condos” (i.e., states that have the infrastructure to support the international flow of illicit people, funds, and information). The preference for “condos” suggests that countries most devoid of functioning government institutions may sometimes be less conducive to a terrorist presence than countries that are still weak, but retain some governmental effectiveness.15 International Crime. As with terrorist groups, international criminal organizations benefit from safe havens that weak and failing states provide. According to the U.S. Interagency Working Group report on international crime, weak states can be useful sites through which criminals can move illicit contraband and launder their proceeds, due to unenforced laws and high levels of official corruption.16 Since the Cold War, the international community has seen a surge in the number of transnational crime groups emerging in safe havens of weak, conflict-prone states — especially in the Balkans, Central Asia, and West Africa. Criminal groups can thrive off the illicit needs of failing states, especially those subject to international sanctions; regimes and rebel groups have been known to solicit the services of vast illicit arms trafficking networks to fuel deadly conflicts in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan when arms embargoes had been imposed by the United Nations and other members of the international community.17 Links between transnational crime and terrorists groups are also apparent: Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have worked with several criminal actors, ranging from rebel groups in the West African diamond trade to crime groups in the Tri-Border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, among others.18 In 2008, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official stated that at least 19 of 43 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) listed by the State Department have established links to drug trafficking.19 Some researchers contend, however, that the weakest states are not necessarily the most attractive states for international criminals. This may be because some illicit transnational groups might be too dependent on access to global financial services, modern telecommunication systems, transportation, and infrastructure that do not exist in weak states. Researchers also find that some forms of international crime are more associated with weak states than others. Narcotics trafficking and illicit arms smuggling, for example, often flow through weak states. However, other types, such as counterfeiting and financial fraud, may be more prevalent in wealthier states.20 Weapons Proliferation. Weak and failing states, unable or unwilling to guarantee the security of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBRN) materials and related equipment, may facilitate underground networks that smuggle them. Endemic corruption and weak border controls raise the possibility of these states being used as transshipment points for illicit CBRN trafficking. Porous international borders and weak international controls have contributed to 1,080 confirmed nuclear and radiological material trafficking cases by member states from 1993 to 2006, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.21 The majority of smuggled nuclear material reportedly originates in Central Asia and the Caucasus where known stockpiles are said to be inadequately monitored.22 Other sources of concern include poorly secured materials in research, industrial, and medical facilities. A relatively new region of concern for the United States is Africa, where more than 18 of the world’s known recoverable uranium resources exist. Lax regulations, weak governments, and remotely located mines that are difficult to supervise combine to make the removal and trafficking of radioactive substances in Africa “a very real prospect.”23 Analysts also contend that while the potential for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) trafficking through weak states is considerable, most weak states may be unlikely destinations for smuggled WMD devices. Such equipment requires a certain level of technological sophistication that may not exist in some weak and failing states.24 Regional Instability. According to recent research, states do not always become weak or failed in isolation — and the spread of instability across a region can serve as a critical multiplier of state vulnerability to threats. Instability has a tendency to spread beyond a weak state’s political borders, through overwhelming refugee flows, increased arms smuggling, breakdowns in regional trade, and many other ways.25 The National Intelligence Council acknowledges that state failure and its associated regional implications pose an “enormous cost in resources and time” to the United States.26
SOLVENCY:
- Increased participation prevents backlash against environmental policies.
IRVIN 04
Renee A. Irvin, assistant professor in the Department of Planning, Public Policy, and Management at the University of Oregon. John Stansbury, associate professor of civil engineering at the University of Nebraska. Jan/Feb 2004. “Citizen Participation in Decisionmaking: is it Worth the Effort?” Public Administration Review
Notwithstanding the ambiguous mention of using scarce resources, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should be commended for its efforts to incorporate more citizen involvement into environmental protection programs (Fiorino 2000). With improved community relations as a motivating goal, the EPA pushed for national and regional enhancements in environmental decision making throughout the latter half of the 19903. This ambitious effort has not been limited to the EPA, nor to environmental management. At all levels of government, citizen-participation programs have been launched since the l950s (Day 1997), with the underlying assumption that if citizens become actively involved as participants in their democracy, the governance that emerges from this process will be more democratic and more effective. Arguments for enhanced citizen participation often rest on the merits of the process and the belief that an engaged citizenry is better than a passive citizenry (King, Feltey, and Susel 1998; Putnam 1995; Arnstein 1969). With citizen participation, formulated policies might be more realistically grounded in citizen preferences, the public might become more sympathetic evaluators of the tough decisions that government administrators have to make, and the improved support from the public might create a less divisive, combative populace to govern and regulate. However, incorporating citizen input into agency decision making is not a costless process. This article articulates not just the potential benefits, but also the social and economic costs of community participation, so that policy makers may better predict the usefulness of citizen participation initiatives. The article first explores the potentially wide-ranging benefits of enhanced community participation. Drawbacks to community participation are evaluated next, including a brief discussion of the relative costs of citizen participation versus representational decision making. We then describe an attempt to incorporate community participation into a management program for a degraded urban watershed, and note the characteristics that made this project unusually challenging. We highlight place-based characteristics that may predict the success or failure of community participation programs. In effect, we take a step back from the “how to" literature to determine whether to at all.
She continues
Renee A. Irvin, assistant professor in the Department of Planning, Public Policy, and Management at the University of Oregon. John Stansbury, associate professor of civil engineering at the University of Nebraska. Jan/Feb 2004. “Citizen Participation in Decisionmaking: is it Worth the Effort?” Public Administration Review
Participatory structures such as citizen advisory boards were adopted in the 1980s and 1990s to improve upon the one-way flow of information in public hearings on proposed environmental policies. The review and comment methodology-decide on the policy, then introduce it to the public in a public hearing-is a poor educational vehicle for complex topics, not to mention grossly inadequate as a persuasion tool, though it is still used extensively (Beierle I999). In some areas of the rural West, actions on the part of environmental regulators are met with hostility because the government entity is regarded strictly as an outsider, unfamiliar and unsympathetic to local economic conditions. Kenney describes this hostility: “Why is it nearly impossible to take a breath of western air or a drink of western water without heating laments of federal paternalism, and without being aware of the stirrings of new ‘Sagebrush Rebellions’..." (2000, 57). In this milieu, a small community can stage a media-friendly protest event and ignite sympathies nationwide. Such events provide grist for the political mill, and even national-level environmental protection funding may be jeopardized in response. Rourke describes how intense media attention can derail an agency‘s well-intended programs: “Any sudden expansion in the public that takes an interest in its activities may be a threat for an executive agency… The agency may thus come under a critical scrutiny it had never experienced, and it may soon find itself under strong pressure to change the thrust of its decisions” (I984, 51--52). Citizen participation in environmental policy formation, therefore, is useful for informing regulators of exactly where volatile public backlash is likely to occur, and for winning the sympathies of a few influential citizens in places where opposition to environmental regulation is strongest.
2. The aff is impossible for developing countries because they are dependent on resources. The CP functions as a prerequisite to the aff by reducing dependence.
SLACK 4
Keith Slack, 2004. Senior Policy Advisor for Oxfam America. “Sharing the Riches of the Earth: Democratizing Natural Resource-Led Development” Ethics and International Affairs
The improvement of current extraction practice can be seen as a means of furthering the transition away from the “extractive paradigm.” If extraction can be made more just, perhaps then the newly empowered civil societies in extraction-dependent countries can increase their pressure for a more just world order. Nevertheless, the obstacles to even this rather preliminary step are formidable. In the short to medium terms, however, poor countries like Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia cannot feasibly undertake policies that dramatically reduce their dependence on resource extraction, so it remains important to promote policies that help to limit or compensate for the harms that extractive practices engender. It is also important, however, to clarify the means by which states can be pressured to adopt these policies. International financial institution conditionality—delinked from profit motive— could be one way to provide incentives to otherwise reluctant states. Making participation a component of a “green” premium paid by Northern consumers of extractive products may be another. Ultimately, by demonstrating a real commitment to participation and respecting local concerns about resource extraction, governments may increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, thus enhancing their stability and long-term economic prospects. Most importantly, greater opportunities for public participation in revenue distribution decision-making, particularly for the most impacted poor and marginalized groups, can and intensify the pressure on governments to use wisely the benefits derived from these natural endowments.