Tournament: Barkley Forum | Round: 1 | Opponent: Valley GS | Judge: Chris Castillo
I will update this before Penn, I typed it out and it all got deleted....

Plan: Russian Federation should abandon Arctic Resource extraction and prioritize the international security environment

Plan: RF should abandon ARE and pursue a coalition with the USFG to provide HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention to its citizens through harms reduction programs

Advocacy: The debate room is a field to acknowledge and re-affirm our ties to nature

Stock:
Consequentialist frame- 

1. precludes agent
   2. no actor unity
   3. egalitarian

Contentions

1. RE leads to Global warming, destroys our ability to grow food
   2. RE destroys Biodiversity, leads to extinction.
   3. EP solves

Tournament: GFCA STATE | Round: 1 | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any

Value: Morality

Propositions of value prove that humanity is an end in itself. Any moral system must assume human worth.
Professor Christine Korsgaard 96. 

(Prof of Philo @ Harvard). “The Sources of Normativity.” 1996.

This is just a fancy new model .... must be valued for its own sake.  

Therefore, humanity can only be valued as an end in itself. The value of humanity means that no good can be justified in using humans as means
Professor Allen Wood. Wood, Allen. Professor of Philosophy at Stanford. "Duties to Oneself, Duties of Respect to Others." THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO (2009): 229.
Humanity as end in itself is not an “end” ... humanity than its dignity demands.

This means that if humans are valuable as ultimate ends, then we have a duty to not do anything that violates their humanity. Humans must be respected as ultimate, inviolable ends under any moral system. Thus...

my value criterion is respecting humans as ends in themselves.

Candace Gauthier, Professor of Ethics at UNC Wilmington "Privacy Invasion by the News Media: Three Ethical Models," Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 17:1 (2002) 20-34.
A Kantian analysis ....rather than as a rational agent.

Contention 1: RE uses natives as means to an end

Lennox 12.
Dr Corinne Lennox is Senior Lecturer in Human Rights and Associate Director of the Human Rights Consortium. Natural resource development and the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples. State of the World’s Minorities
and Indigenous Peoples 2012. http://www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=1114
This year’s State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples ...norms for protection.

SUNS 2011.
South-North Development Monitor (SUNS) #7223 Thursday 22 September 2011. Extractive industries' impact on indigenous peoples. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/humanrights/indigenous/7223_HR.doc. sorry for the bad cite

Oxfam 2009
Oxfam Briefing Paper December 2009. Lifting the Resource Curse. How poor people can and should benefit from the revenues of extractive industries. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp134-lifting-the-resource-curse-011209.pdf
Mining investment in Ghana had  ....in previously protected forest areas.

Then, analytics on how environmental protection inherently doesn’t use humans as means to an end

Tournament: GFCA STATE | Round: Triples | Opponent: Any | Judge: any

First, banning harmful resource extraction is inherently the definition of environmental protection so it respecting indigenous people is inherently protecting the environment.

Second, when indigenous peoples are respected as ends in themselves, they actively protect the environment and give the world traditional knowledge that can help remedy harms. Suagee 95

Dean B. Suagee. Member of Cherokee Nation, He has worked with a number of tribal governments on environmental and cultural resource matters, including the establishment of tribal regulatory programs for environmental protection. He also serves as a member of the summer faculty of Vermont Law School and the adjunct faculty of the Washington College of Law. Indigenous Rights and Responsibilities for the Natural World. Human Rights Brief 1995. American University. http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v2i3/suagee23.ht=

Mother Earth is suffering, and American Indian tribes and other indigenous peoples have important work to do, defending her against destruction and helping her to heal. In many parts of the world, indigenous peoples are fighting to protect their homelands from the kinds of environmental destruction that some people call "development." In addition to opposing destruction, indigenous peoples have become involved in the global movement to fashion approaches to development that are environmentally sustainable. Many indigenous cultures provide living examples of sustainability over centuries or millennia, and some people in the industrialized world, myself included, have suggested that a great deal could be learned from the ways in which indigenous cultures provide for the material needs of human communities and the value systems that underlie and reinforce material cultures. One basic value shared by many indigenous cultures holds that human communities have responsibilities to future generations and to the natural world.¶Some might suggest that the most compelling reasons for promoting the survival of indigenous peoples are the potential benefits for the world. For example, many indigenous peoples live in environments rich in biodiversity, and their cultural knowledge of medicinal uses of plants can be transformed into medicines that save lives or help people regain their health, and yield huge profits for multinational pharmaceutical companies. Some environmental activists might suggest that the chances of stopping ecologically catastrophic megaproject boondoggles are significantly enhanced when indigenous peoples are prominently featured on the front lines (as was the case in shelving phase II of the James Bay project in Quebec), and that the world at large benefits when such boondoggles are stopped.¶I think that there is a more compelling and more basic reason for people in the world at large, and especially for lawyers who practice international law, to be concerned with the survival of indigenous peoples - they are human societies, and by virtue of this they are entitled to fundamental human rights.¶Over the last two decades, an international movement has emerged that seeks recognition under international law for the human rights of indigenous peoples. Much of the action has occurred in Geneva at the annual meetings of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which was established in 1982 under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Commissions and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. For much of its existence, the Working Group has focused most of its attention on one part of its mandate - the development of standards to protect the human rights of indigenous peoples.¶The simple fact that the Working Group was given this mandate constitutes recognition by the international community that existing human rights instruments are inadequate to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. From the perspective of indigenous peoples, the most fundamental of indigenous human rights are collective, rather than individual, such as the right to exist as distinct peoples, to be protected against physical and cultural genocide, to exercise self-government and freely determine for themselves their relationships with the states of the world, and to control the habitats and resources of their traditional homelands.¶In its eleventh annual session in 1993, the Working Group approved the text of the draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and forwarded the draft for eventual action by the UN General Assembly. The draft Declaration sets forth rights that, according to Article 42, constitute the "minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world." Throughout the forty-five articles that make up the draft Declaration, numerous provisions demonstrate the Working Group's acceptance of the importance of collective rights for indigenous peoples to carry out their distinct ways of life. Similarly, numerous provisions recognize the importance of the spiritual and cultural ties that indigenous peoples have to their homelands.¶Two articles in particular, Articles 25 and 26, express some of the basic concerns of indigenous peoples for the protection of the natural world. Article 25 provides that indigenous peoples "have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and material relationship with the lands, territories, waters and coastal seas" as well as the right "to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard." Article 26 provides, in part, that "indigenous peoples have the right ... to the full recognition of their laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the development and management of resources." These articles taken together reflect the concerns of indigenous peoples for environmental protection, but not in the mold of a regulatory regime imposed from outside by a national or sub-national government that claims authority over an indigenous people and its homeland. Rather, for indigenous peoples, environmental protection is a human right that includes recognition of indigenous peoples' own governmental authority over their territories.¶In my work with American Indian tribes, I have come to appreciate the diversity that exists among tribes, diversity that grows from many kinds of roots, including the diversity of the natural environment in which tribal cultures have developed and the different historical patterns of their dealings with the United States. In light of this diversity among tribes, I feel compelled to counsel caution against sweeping generalizations. But, I believe that the cultural value reflected in Article 25 - that in their spiritual and material relationships with the natural world, indigenous peoples have responsibilities to future generations - is a very widely held value. Indigenous peoples regard the natural world as sacred, and they regard themselves as part of the natural world.¶There is one other generalized lesson from the experience of American Indian tribes that I think rings true on a widespread basis. Indian communities do better, live better, when they govern themselves, and when the larger society respects their right of self-government and conveys some sense of appreciation for the fact that Indian cultures are part of the fabric of American society. I think that there is no better way to show one's belief in the value of the cultures of indigenous peoples than by recognizing the fundamental right of these peoples to govern themselves and their territories. This is what the struggle for the human rights of indigenous peoples is all about.

+Some analytics

Tournament: Harvard | Round: 1 | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any

The Butler cards are from her book Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence.
Stanescu from Stanescu, J. Professor James Stanescu from Binghamton University (2012), Species Trouble: Judith Butler, Mourning, and the Precarious Lives of Animals. Hypatia, 27: 567–582. doi: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2012.01280.x

Chris Williams internationally published author who has written feature articles covering  politics, race, culture, entertainment and world events. He is a frequent contributor to The Guardian, The Atlantic, The Huffington Post, MSNBC's The Grio, Colorlines and Ebony. Violence Against Our Environment. Truth-out. 10 December 2013. http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/20561-violence-against-our-environment ===

“Should” means to normative obligations so I value morality. Moral obligation to the other arises from a collective vulnerability.  This entails that there is no I outside of our relationships with the Other. Butler 03

But is there another normative aspiration that we must also seek to articulate and to defend? Is there a way in which the place of the body, and the way in which it disposes us outside ourselves or sets us beside ourselves, opens up another kind of normative aspiration within the field of politics?  The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the and flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch, and to violence, and bodies put us at risk of becoming the agency and instrument of all these as well. Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, but they the very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever only our own. The body has its invariably public dimension. and it’s Constituted as a social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not mine. Given over from the start to the world of others, it bears their imprint, is formed within the crucible of social life; only later, and with some uncertainty, do I lay claim to my body as my own, if, in fact, I ever do. Indeed, if I deny that prior to the formation of my “will,” my body relatesd me to others whom I did not choose to have in proximity to myself, if I build a notion of “autonomy” on the basis of the denial of this sphere of a primary and unwilled physical proximity with others, then am I denying the social conditions of my embodiment in the name of autonomy?  At one level, this situation is literally familiar: there is bound to be some experience of humiliation for adults, who think that they are exercising judgment in matters of love, to reflect upon the fact that, as infants and young children, they loved their parents or other primary others in absolute and uncritical ways— and that something of that pattern lives on in their adult relationships. I may wish to reconstitute my “self” as if it were there all along, a tacit ego with acumen from the start; but to do so would be to deny the various forms of rapture and subjection that formed the condition of my emergence as an individuated being and that continue to haunt my adult sense of self with whatever anxiety and longing I may now feel.  Individuation is an accomplishment, not a presupposition, and certainly no guarantee. ¶Is there a reason to apprehend and affirm this condition of my formation within the sphere of politics, a sphere monopolized by adults? If I am struggling for autonomy, do I not need to be struggling for something else as well, a conception of myself as invariably in community, impressed upon by others, impinging upon them as well, and in ways that are not fully in my control or clearly predictable? ¶Is there a way that we might struggle for autonomy in many spheres, yet also consider the demands that are imposed upon us by living in a world of beings who are, by definition, physically dependent on one another, physically vulnerable to one another?  Is this not another way of imagining community, one in which we are alike only in having this condition separately and so having in common a condition that cannot be thought without difference? This way of imagining community affirms relationality not only as a descriptive or historical fact of our formation, but also as an ongoing normative dimension of our social and political lives, one in which we are compelled to take stock of our interdependence. According to this latter view, it would become incumbent on us to consider the place of violence in any such relation, for violence is, always, an exploitation of that primary tie, that primary way in which we are, as bodies, outside ourselves and for one another.  We are something other than “autonomous” in such a condition, but that does not mean that we are merged or without boundaries. It does mean, however, that, when we think about who we “are” and seek to represent ourselves, we cannot represent ourselves as merely bounded