According to~Adolf Reed~, reparations demands represent the confluence of three factors, material, psychological, and symbolic (Slavery, Racist violence, American Apartheild: the case for Reparations, Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua)
Keita defines reparations as
~Keita's book: Slavery, Racist violence, American Apartheid: the case for reparations" The book~
Reparations demands represent the confluence of three factors, material, psychological, and symbolic. Material components refer to justifications for reparations that are premised on the structural aspects of racial oppression. Examples would include labor exploitation, racist violence, de jure and de facto discriminatory State policies, and non- exploitative economic oppression. The symbolic element focuses on memorializing injustices via apologies, monument building, and the reconstruction of instruction. Whereas the symbolic component is aimed at the general U.S. public, the psychological element specifically targets African Americans.5
Prefer this field text definition because. Field context is the best standard because it is provides the most predictable interpretation of the text since words have different meanings in different contexts. Since the text of the resolution is the only guarantee that both debaters have when entering a round, the words it contains are the only stable determinants of ground. Predictability outweighs ground; there is no way to utilize ground in a round if a debater was not able to adequately prepare to defend it.
And to win Neg must 1, defend that justice prohibits reparations, because the negative would have prohibition and permission, a 2-1 out ground hurting reciprocity because reciprocity is key to fairness, 2 theory is drop the debater for a neg loss, but drop the argument for a the affirmative, because neg is iniciating theory, and they would run frivoulus if theory did not have detrimental impacts, furthermore neg cannot run thory because if the aff is being abuseive the neg can ricprocate that abusivity, so theory is auto rvi for the aff
Self-actualization is defined as the achivement of ones full potential and , it is the source of human value . Self-actualization is the only necessary facet of the self and is the necessary and sufficient basis for morality. It is the unconditioned end. Wood1 writes: Hegel's self-actualization theory represents a distinctive type of ethical theory, different from both deontological and teleological theories.9 It begins neither with an imperative, law, or principle to be followed nor with the idea of an end to be achieved. Its starting point is the conception of a certain self or identity to be exercised or actualized, to be embodied and expressed in action. The theory selects the actions to be performed and the ends to be pursued because they are the actions and ends of that kind of self. In such a theory, laws and commandments owe their force to the fact that they turn out to be principles which the right sort of self would follow. Ends owe their desirability to the fact that they turn out to be the ends which that sort of self would pursue. In such a theory, it is misleading to consider "self-actualization" as the end or goal of the self. If the self is successful, it does actualize itself in doing the right things and pursuing the right ends; but the content of this "self- actualization" cannot be specified independently of those actions and ends. In a theory like Hegel's, "self-actualization" is not to begin with an end with a specifiable content to which such a self directs its efforts. From one point of view, self-actualization is simply a by-product of acting in certain ways, following certain principles and successfully pursuing other ends. But it has the appearance of an end because for a self-actualization theory, these ends have their value and these principles their force because they are the ends and principles of a certain sort of self.10 The starting point of a self-actualization theory is ~Thus~ a certain ~theory~ concept of what human beings are - a concept that cannot ultimately be divorced from the practical self-concern that belongs necessarily to being a self. Hegel sees this as the point of the classical injunction Gnothi seauton ("Know thyself") (EG § 377)* 1° seeking the~this~ knowledge demanded by this injunction, it is bound to be inappropriate to try to draw any ultimate distinction between "facts" and "values," or between theoretical and practical rationality. Asking with self-concern what it is to be human is the same thing as asking what sort of human being one is to be; it is asking about what Hegel calls one's Bestimm- ung -about one's nature and simultaneously about one's vocation. This is the reason Hegel's own account of "subjective spirit" (of the human individual) in the Encyclopedia moves from a discussion of embodiment (EG §§ 388-412) through consciousness and reason (EG §§ 413-439) to theoreti¬ cal spirit (EG §§ 440-468) and ends with practical spirit (EG §§ 469-480) defining itself as free spirit (EG §§ 481-482). Hegel tells us that what have traditionally been thought of as the self's different "faculties" are not so much diverse capacities or activities, as different (and more or less adequate) conceptions of mind or spirit itself and as a whole, or stages in its development toward self-knowledge (EG §§ 379,A, 380). The "practical spirit" or "will" therefore includes the theoretical, because the basis of theoretical concern is practical concern, concern with what I am and am to be (PR § 4A).And the outcome of this concern is the awareness that what I am is freedom, that is, a being whose vocation is to know itself and actualize its knowledge of itself(£G§48i). It is the development of this simultaneously theoretical and practical self- concept of the human individual in the Philosophy of Right which we have sketched in §§ 5-8 of this chapter. We have seen that the scaffolding of the Philosophy of Right is the developing image of the free will or self-knowing and self-concerned human agent, conceiving of itself successively, ever more concretely and adequately, first as a "person" possessing abstract rights, then as a "subject" with a moral vocation, then in the concrete spheres of ethical life as a family member, then a burgher, and finally as a citizen. To each of these self-images there correspond determinate activities, prin¬ ciples to be followed, and ends to be pursued and achieved, either individu¬ ally (as in the "abstract" spheres of abstract right and morality) or together with others in the context of determinate social institutions (as in the sphere of ethical life, in the family, civil society, and the state). The principles and ends, however, are seen as binding and valuable because they are ways in which the free will actualizes the various aspects or moments of its self- knowledge or identity. That is what Hegel means when he calls the system of "right" a system in which "freedom is its own object" and describes Idea or self-actualized free will as "the free will that wills the free will" (PR § 27).
Self-actualization requires recognition Farnham1
Wrongful action has communicative and consequential effects, but it also creates a situation where one person is inferior to another in the way he or she is treated. A proper response to such action is not just to deny what it asserts or to avert future bad consequences, but also ~is~ to rectify this imbalance. This is the Hegelian interpretation of wrongful action—it invokes Hegel’s idea of the we~ need to give our abstract ideas (such as autonomy or right) concrete expression through the use of social conventions that mediate our lives together.24 We need to do this because we are not primarily debaters about what is true, we are primarily embodied agents living in a world together, our activities coordinated by conven- tions. Our ultimate purpose is not to know what the world is like, but to do and create and to know ourselves as doers and creators. Hampton’s ideas of realization of value and acknowledgement of value are best understood on the Hegelian model of an ideal to be realized concretely and publicly in the world of human action. It is never true that the victim has less value than others, but in cases of wrongful action the victim's value is not realized or acknowledged. The fact that we are embodied, and live in a world where external forces and other embodied agents can physically influence what we do, means that the realization of our value in this world is not solely up to us. That we live with others and care about how they regard us means that the acknowledgement of our value is not up to us. Damage to the realization and acknowledgement of a person’s value are what Hampton calls diminishment.25 To see better what she meant by this, we need to look more closely at the notions of realization and acknowledgement.
The standard is facilitating self-actualization
Recognition is important for two reasons:
A) recognition is the basis of the "we", which is basically the state: Stern 1
The normative significance of mutual recognition-what is at stake- becomes clear principally in the negations and distortions of recognition that undermine, prevent, or harm the self in its mediated actualization. Misrecognition not only prevents the I from becoming a We, it also prevents the achievement of proper independence within relationship and Full participation in ethical life." This, rather than the practices of any specific community, constitutes the normative significance of recognition. Recognition is a condition of self-actualization in this sense: it establishes the fundamental intersubjective pattern of sell-actualization immanent in the normative institutions ethical life; these institutions are both extensions and conditions of mediated free self-actualization.
Essays on Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit by David Stern
Stern 1 says that government would not exist to represent every one without mutual recognition
B) refer back to Farnham saying that recognition is key to self-actualizations
I contend that one of the ways a state can reparate is by monuments
The state provides for self actualization by recognizing the worth of people Ringmar1
But Hegel also stressed that recognition by others is never immediately forth¬ coming, but instead something for which individuals would have to fight. In the chapter on 'Lordship and Bondage' in the Phenomenology of Spirit he imagined a situation where two individuals were facing each other, neither of them recognized the other.31 Between them a struggle for recognition ensued through which one of them came to be recognized as superior-both by himself and by the other-while the other came to be regarded as inferior. The 'master' gained recognition from the 'slave' by 'going all the way' and risking his own life, while the slave, cautiously, preferred to save his life and to accept his inferior position. 32 As Hegel went on to say, however, the master was unlikely to be satisfied with his victory for very long. The slave was only a slave after all, and the recognition he granted was simply not enough. What the master craved most of all was not just recognition, but recognition from someone equal to himself; respect granted by someone he himself in turn respected. The difference between the master and the slave had to be overcome, and the mechanism through which this was to take place was the slave's capacity to develop himself through the force of his own labour. As Hegel argued, the slave could educate himself and become 'someone' as he worked on his capacities and on the world around him. In this way recognition and personal identity came to be seen as achievements which only could take place in the course of time. Hegel envisioned social relations as becoming increasingly equal as more and more individuals freed themselves both from the determination by nature and from the subjugation imposed upon them by others. A society where each individual is recognized by all others and treated with respect is what Hegel referred to as an 'ethical community'. In such a community the law is not a conservative force, but instead the guarantee that a person is treated decently and granted the right to develop his or her personality and individual capacities. A 'right' according to Hegel is fundamentally a right to recognition
And prefer my frame work over deont because because if we do not solve for the lack of realization in the modern state the effects will become exasterbated
Robert Post, law professor, UC-Berkeley, WILLIAM and MARY LAW REVIEW, Winter 1991, p. 291.
A recurring theme in the contemporary literature is that racist expression ought to be regulated because it creates what has been termed " deontic" harm. The basic point is that there is an "elemental wrongness" to racist expression ~of not realizing your fellow man~, regardless of the presence or absence of particular empirical consequences such as "grievous, severe psychological injury." It is argued that toleration for racist expression is inconsistent with respect for "the principle of equality" that is at the heart of the fourteenth amendment. The thrust of this argument is that a society committed to ideals of social and political equality cannot remain passive: it must issue unequivocal expressions of solidarity with vulnerable minority groups and make positive statements affirming its commitment to those ideals. Laws prohibiting racist speech must be regarded as important components of such expressions and statements.
And monuments are a way to remember and recognize,
Look to the root of the word monument Moneo, Monere, Monui, Monitus, meaning to remember, and advise, this monuments are a tool the state can utilize
therefore my plan text is Plan Text: The United States people will provide symbolic reparations via creating a memorial to the slaves who built dc, including the capitol, white house, and supreme court building.
Inherency: there is currently no mention of the use of slavery in the Capitol building. Randal Robinson says regarding the use of slaves in the building of the capitol:
The frieze figures are not all white. Native Americans appear in several of the scenes. In one, the only depiction of an act of violence, a Native American holds back the arms and head of another Native American, as still another Native American coils to bludgeon the pinioned figure. Hmmm. Although the practice of slavery lay heavily athwart the new country for most of the depicted age, the frieze presents nothing at all from this long, scarring period. No Douglass. No Tubman. No slavery. No blacks, period. At ground level, set back into the circular stone wall are several huge oil paintings. We see the explorer De Soto discovering the Mississippi River. Next, an elaborately gowned, kneeling Pocahontas receives the baptismal sacrament amidst English gentry in a soaring sanctuary. And there is Columbus triumphantly landing in the Americas. - No reference is made to blacks or slavery in any of the paintings. In the whole of the Rotunda, only a small bust of Martin Luther King Jr. intrudes on an overall iconography of an America that is self-consciously homogeneous and pleased with itself.' The King bust is a poor likeness of the man.—from the Debt: what America owes to blacks pg2 To erect the building that would house the art that symbolized American democracy, the United States government sent out a request for one hundred slaves. The first stage of the Capitol's construction would run from 1793 to 1802. In ex- change for the slaves' labor the government agreed to pay their owner: five dollars per month per slave. Slaves were not only made to labor on the Capitol building but also to do much of the work in implementing Pierre- Charles L'Enfant's grand design for the whole of the District of Columbia. L'Enfant had decided to place the Capitol building on Jenkins Hill and the President's Palace (later the White House) on another hill, which was at the time covered by an orchard. Slaves were used to clear a broad swath of forest between the sites for the two buildings. I looked up again at Brumidi's celebration of the "principles upon which the United States was founded" and visualized the glistening backs of blacks with ropes and pulleys heaving the ponderous stones of the dome into place. I then went down a floor to a gift kiosk run by the Capitol Historical Society to look for books about the Capitol's construction. I found two: In the Greatest Solemn Dignity and Uncle Sam’s Architect: Builders of the Capitol. Neither book mentioned anything about the use of slave labor—Randall Robinson as above
He goes on to discuss the two books in the capitol about how the building was constructed, In the Greatest Solemn Dignity and Uncle Sam's Architect: Builders of the Capitol. He says "Neither book mentioned anything about the use of slave labor"
ADVANTAGE
SELF –ACTUALIZATION VIA SOVERNINTY, OR REALIZATION, IS KEY TO CULTURAL SURVIVAL
Robert B. Porter, Professor of Law and Tribal Land and Government Center Director, University of Kansas, ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, Spring, 2002, p. 108.
Does having sovereignty really even matter? Yes, sovereignty really does matter, but the extent to which sovereignty matters depends upon how Indigenous people view their future. I believe that sovereignty-or whatever we decide to call it-is the life blood of not just Indigenous peoples, but all peoples. Without the ability to make choices about the future, Indigenous societies are simply appendages of the colonizing society; like a tail is an appendage on a dog. Only by having control over the future-by having true freedom-can a people have a meaningful life. This objective is especially important considering that Indigenous peoples have been subject to colonizing influences that have ultimately sought the complete subjugation of, and even elimination of them as separate human societies.
LOSS OF CULTURAL SURVIVAL THREATENS PLANETARY EXTINCTION
Russel Lawrence Barsh,
Professor of Native American Studies, University of Lethbridge, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM, Winter 1993, p. 312. There no longer seems to be much difference in the Westernization of the Third World AND the rest of the world, including the indigenous peoples of other regions.
Under view
Presume aff because of side bias. Henson and Dorasil1 provide 3 warrants for neg bias
Prefer this:
The large sample size prevents the risk of a statistical anomaly Theoretical reasons come first because the ballot asks who did the better debating; disadvantages must be taken into account. Your job isn't to determine the truth of the resolution, but the better debater.
Neg theory violations must be checked in cross-examination. This prevents AND an RVI ensures the perfect strategic value since it encourages checking legitimate abuse.
Welfare
To achive proper welfare and equality, we must first have self actualization via abstract right:
Wood:
For Hegel, the "higher right" of the state (or of other spheres) in comparison with abstract right does not consist in the state's (or any other sphere's) having the prerogative of ignoring people's abstract right.' Rather. it consists in certain determinate ways in which considerations of abstract right need to be adjusted to considerations arising from those higher spheres. Abstract right is, for instance, limited by morality, whose primary end, Hegel maintains, is the particular welfare or happiness of individuals. Because abstract right is supposed to abstract from all particular needs and wants. there is no abstract right to the means of subsistence: the abstract right to life is no abstract right to the means of subsistence; the abstract right to life consists only in the right not to be wrongfully deprived of life through force (PR § 49R). Hegel argues. however. that when what is at stake is a person's particular interests as a whole, in the form of personal existence or life, that life deserves to prevail against the property rights of someone else.
