Tournament: All | Round: 1 | Opponent: All | Judge: All
I'm running a great deal of undisclosed cases, but if you have any questions about anything I'm running or plan to run contact me on facebook or email me at andenick at gmail.com, hopefully I can help you out with whatever you need.

Also, be friendly. I like people. I wear the colored pants because I'm an attention whore, not because I'm a social recluse.

See you on the circuit!

Update: I'm teaching at NDF, so feel free to talk to me about attending, we'd love to have you!

Tournament: Berkeley | Round: 1 | Opponent: All | Judge: All
Hey Y'all

Some plan texts:

1. The government of Nigeria should ban all oil drilling near the Niger Delta.
   2. All less-industrialized countries should create systems of community based resource management, which allows those in poverty to be included in the decision-making process in deliberating what should be done with natural resources.
   3. All less-industrialized countries of Africa that currently mine for diamonds cease all operations and institute an embargo on all diamond related trade.
   4. The debate community should prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction. No this case isn't real, but how legit would it be if I wrote it!

If you have more developed disclosure theory shells that require more things, I'd appreciate it if you emailed me at andenick at gmail dot com so that I can give you what you need to prep me out

Los Otros Affs:
All of the same affs from Sunvite and the RR, meaning anthro, queered eco, and an indonesia plan. I'm less likely to run the other plans disclosed from Sunvite because they're less fun to debate than the others, but I mean if there's an aff you really REALLY want me to run, let me know!

Tournament: SunvitationalRR | Round: Quads | Opponent: Jess  Miami Beach  JP Stuckert  Yael  NB All aff rounds except on Saahil I larped | Judge: Tara  Loren  Wilder  Siggy  David  Kawahara  Ross  Castillo  Ernie Rose
I affirm.
Act 1 is the Being in the World
Being and identity is not a human concept, rather a collective experience with the world, as we are a simple Being in the world. In order to understand our own ontology, we must embrace Being-in-the-world on earth as a starting point for replacing the subject-object dichotomy of human-nonhuman relations. This ontological standpoint allows us to see the inherent value in all of the world’s elements.  Recognizing the interconnected aspect of life forces us away from the dualisms that have allowed for the devaluation of our surroundings. This means the recognition of our Being-in-the-world comes as a prerequisite to any question of ethics as we epistemically understand ourselves and conceive obligations.

Henning (Brian G., Trusting in the 'Efficacy of Beauty': A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy, Ethics and the Environment, Volume 14.1 p.108-110)
Once we recognize that every individual—from a subatomic event to¶ a majestic sequoia—brings together the diverse elements in its world in¶ just this way, just here, and just now, we see that nothing is entirely devoid¶ of value and beauty. This process whereby many diverse individuals are¶ brought together into the unity of one new individual, which will eventually¶ add its energy to future individuals, characterizes the most basic¶ feature of reality and is what Whitehead calls the “category of creativity.”¶ On this view, reality is best characterized not as an unending march of¶ vacuous facts, but as an incessant “creative advance” striving toward everricher¶ forms of beauty and value.¶ Noting its emphasis on interdependence and interrelation, many scholars¶ have rightly noted that Whitehead’s metaphysics is uniquely suited¶ to provide a basis for making sense of our relationship to the natural¶ world.10 Decades before modern ecologists taught us about ecosystems,¶ Whitehead was describing individuals as interrelated societies of societies.¶ No individual, Whitehead insisted, can be understood apart from¶ its relationship to others.11 Indeed, whereas ecologists only explain how¶ it is that macroscopic individuals are related in interdependent systems,¶ Whitehead’s organic metaphysics of process provides a rich account of¶ how individuals at every level of complexity—from subatomic events to¶ ecosystems, and from oak trees to galaxies—arise and are perpetuated.12 What is more, Whitehead’s philosophy of organism places a premium on¶ an individual’s dependence on and relationship to the larger wholes of¶ which it is a part without making the mistake of subsuming the individual¶ into that larger whole.13 With the philosophy of organism we need not¶ choose between either the one or the many, “the many become one and¶ are increased by one” (Whitehead 1929 1978, 21).¶ By providing a robust alternative to the various forms of reductive¶ physicalism and destructive dualism that currently dominate many¶ branches of science and philosophy, the philosophy of organism is an¶ ideal position from which to address the complex social and ecological¶ challenges confronting us. First, if who and what I am is intimately and¶ inextricably linked to everyone and everything else in the universe, then I¶ begin to recognize that my own flourishing and the flourishing of others¶ are not independent. Not only do I intimately and unavoidably depend on¶ others in order to sustain myself, with varying degrees of relevance, how I¶ relate to my environment is constitutive of who and what I am. As we are¶ quickly learning, we ignore our interdependence with our wider environment¶ at our own peril.¶ Moreover, in helping us to recognizing our connection to and dependence¶ on our larger environment, an organic model forces us to abandon¶ the various dualisms that have for too long allowed us to maintain the¶ illusion that we are set off from the rest of nature. Adopting an organic¶ metaphysics of process forces us finally to step down from the self-constructed¶ pedestal from which we have for millennia surveyed nature and¶ finally to embrace the lesson so compellingly demonstrated by Darwin:¶ humans are not a singular exception to, but rather a grand exemplification¶ of, the processes at work in the universe.14 In this way we ought¶ finally to reject not only the materialisms of contemporary science, but¶ also the dualisms that often undergird our religious, social, political, and¶ moral understandings of ourselves and our relationship to the natural¶ world. As John Dewey concisely put it, “man is within nature, not a little¶ god outside” (1929, 351). Until we shed our self-deluding arrogance¶ and recognize that who and what we are as a species is fundamentally¶ bound up in and dependent on the wider scope of events unfolding in the¶ universe, the ecological crisis will only deepen. Taken seriously, our understanding¶ of reality as composed of vibrant, organically interconnected¶ achievements of beauty and value, has a dramatic effect on how we conceive of ourselves, of nature, and of our moral obligations—morality can¶ no longer be limited merely to inter-human relations.¶ In rejecting modernity’s notion of lifeless matter, we come to recognize¶ that every form of actuality has value in and for itself, for others,¶ and for the whole. In aiming at and achieving an end for itself, every¶ individual—no matter how ephemeral or seemingly insignificant—has intrinsic¶ value for itself and in achieving this self-value it thereby becomes¶ a value for others and for the whole of reality. Every individual, from the¶ most fleeting event in deep space to centuries old redwoods, has value for¶ itself, for others, and for the whole of reality and it is from this character¶ of reality that our moral obligations derive (Whitehead 1938, 111).

Therefore, obligations related to should are contingent upon adapting an ontology related to being-in-the-world. Therefore, obligations to the environment come a priori to any standard as they are linked to our identity.

Further, the root cause of environmental turmoil is rooted in the anthropocentrism. This human-first, technologically dominated mindset ruins our relationship to nature and makes ecological crisis inevitable. 

Sivil, (Richard Sivil studied at the University of Durban Westville, and at the University of Natal, Durban. He has been lecturing philosophy since 1996. "Why we Need a New Ethic for the Environment", Cultural Heritage 2(7): 103 – 116 (2001))

Three most significant and pressing factors contributing to the environmental crisis are the ever increasing human population, the energy crisis, and the abuse and pollution of the earth’s natural systems. These and other factors contributing to the environmental crisis can be directly linked to anthropocentric views of the world. The perception that value is located in, and emanates from, humanity has resulted in understanding human life as an ultimate value, superior to all other beings. This has driven innovators in medicine and technology to ever improve our medical and material conditions, in an attempt to preserve human life, resulting in more people being born and living longer. In achieving this aim, they have indirectly contributed to increasing the human population. Perceptions of superiority, coupled with developing technologies have resulted in a social outlook that generally does not rest content with the basic necessities of life. Demands for more medical and social aid, more entertainment and more comfort translate into demands for improved standards of living. Increasing population numbers, together with the material demands of modern society, place ever increasing demands on energy supplies. While wanting a better life is not a bad thing, given the population explosion the current energy crisis is inevitable, which brings a whole host of environmental implications in tow. This is not to say that every improvement in the standard of living is necessarily wasteful of energy or polluting to the planet, but rather it is the cumulative effect of these improvements that is damaging to the environment. The abuses facing the natural environment as a result of the energy crisis and the food demand are clearly manifestations of anthropocentric views that treat the environment as a resource and instrument for human ends. The pollution and destruction of the non-human natural world is deemed acceptable, provided that it does not interfere with other human beings.
It could be argued that there is nothing essentially wrong with anthropocentric assumptions, since it is natural, even instinctual, to favour one’s self and species over and above all other forms of life. However, it is problematic in that such perceptions influence our actions and dealings with the world to the extent that the well-being of life on this planet is threatened, making the continuance of a huge proportion of existing life forms "tenuous if not improbable" (Elliot 1995: 1). Denying the non-human world ethical consideration, it is evident that anthropocentric assumptions provide a rationale for the exploitation of the natural world and, therefore, have been largely responsible for the present environmental crisis (Des Jardins 1997: 93).
Fox identifies three broad approaches to the environment informed by anthropocentric assumptions, which in reality are not distinct and separate, but occur in a variety of combinations. The "expansionist" approach is characterised by the recognition that nature has a purely instrumental value to humans. This value is accessed through the physical transformation of the non-human natural world, by farming, mining, damming etc. Such practices create an economic value, which tends to "equate the physical transformation of ‘resources’ with economic growth" (Fox 1990: 152). Legitimising continuous expansion and exploitation, this approach relies on the idea that there is an unending supply of resources. The "conservationist" approach, like the first, recognises the economic value of natural resources through their physical transformation, while at the same time accepting the fact that there are limits to these resources. It therefore emphasises the importance of conserving natural resources, while prioritising the importance of developing the non-human natural world in the quest for financial gain. The "preservationist" approach differs from the first two in that it recognises the enjoyment and aesthetic enrichment human beings receive from an undisturbed natural world. Focusing on the psychical nourishment value of the non-human natural world for humans, this approach stresses the importance of preserving resources in their natural states.
All three approaches are informed by anthropocentric assumptions. This results in a one-sided understanding of the human-nature relationship. Nature is understood to have a singular role of serving humanity, while humanity is understood to have no obligations toward nature. Such a perception represents "not only a deluded but also a very dangerous orientation to the world" (Fox 1990: 13), as only the lives of human beings are recognised to have direct moral worth, while the moral consideration of non-human entities is entirely contingent upon the interests of human beings (Pierce and Van De Veer 1995: 9). Humanity is favoured as inherently valuable, while the non-human natural world counts only in terms of its use value to human beings. The "expansionist" and "conservationist" approaches recognise an economic value, while the "preservationist" approach recognises a hedonistic, aesthetic or spiritual value. They accept, without challenge, the assumption that the value of the non-human natural world is entirely dependent on human needs and interests. None attempt to move beyond the assumption that nature has any worth other than the value humans can derive from it, let alone search for a deeper value in nature. This ensures that human duties retain a purely human focus, thereby avoiding the possibility that humans may have duties that extend to non-humans. This can lead to viewing the non-human world, devoid of direct moral consideration, as a mere resource with a purely instrumental value of servitude. This gives rise to a principle of ‘total use’, whereby every natural area is seen for its potential cultivation value, to be used for human ends (Zimmerman 1998: 19). This provides limited means to criticise the behaviour of those who use nature purely as a warehouse of resources (Pierce and Van De Veer 1995: 184).

Finally the anthropocentric mindset culminates in a banishment of Being-in-the-world with us that marks the exploitation and destruction of all nature on Earth.
DeLuca, 5 (Kevin Michael, prof of communication @ University of Utah, Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and¶ Practice, Ethics and the Environment, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring 2005, pp. 67-87)
Machination is unconditional controllability, the domination of all¶ beings, the world, and earth through calculation, acceleration, technicity,¶ and giganticism. Calculation represents a reduction of knowing to mathematics and science and a reduction of the world and earth to what is¶ calculable, a step taken decisively by Descartes (1999, 84–96). Machination¶ is the “pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which¶ everything draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely¶ alien to itself” (1999, 92). The unrestrained domination of¶ machination produces a totalizing worldview that enchants: “When¶ machination finally dominates and permeates everything, then there are¶ no longer any conditions by which still actually to detect the enchantment¶ and to protect oneself from it. The bewitchment by technicity and its constantly¶ self-surpassing progress are only one sign of this enchantment, by virtue of which everything presses forth into calculation, usage, breeding,¶ manageability, and regulation” (1999, 86–87). Heidegger prophetically¶ predicts that machination will produce “a gigantic progress of sciences in¶ the future. These advancements will bring exploitation and usage of the¶ earth as well as rearing and training of humans into conditions that are¶ still inconceivable today” (1999, 108). Animals and plants are reduced to¶ various forms of use value and, more significantly, are banished from¶ Being-in-the-world with us: “What is a plant and an animal to us anymore,¶ when we take away use, embellishment, and entertainment” (1999,¶ 194). “Nature” suffers a similar fate: “What happens to nature in technicity,¶ when nature is separated out from beings by the natural sciences? The¶ growing—or better, the simple rolling unto its end—destruction of¶ ‘nature’. . . . And finally what was left was only ‘scenery’ and recreational¶ opportunity and even this still calculated into the gigantic and arranged¶ for the masses” (1999, 195). Under the unrestrained domination of¶ machination, humans suffer a “hollowing out” (1999, 91, 348) and¶ Being-in-the-world is replaced by “adventures.” (I am here translating¶ Erlebnis as adventure. Others translate it as lived-experience.)
Act 2 is the burden –
The sufficient aff burden is to prove that resource extraction is anthropocentric. This textually affirms because in order to protect the environment, we must adapt a deep ecological ethic, which wouldn’t endorse anthropocentrism.
Act 3 is deep ecology
We must embrace a deep ecological ethical framework especially when discussing developing countries. This is comes as a prerequisite to any other normative theory or coherent theory of political action.

Katz and Oechsli
(Eric, Vice President of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Lauren, Biology at Columbia, Environmental Ethics, vol 15 no 1, 1993 “Moving beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon”)
Can an environmentalist defend a policy of preservation in the Amazon rain forest without violating a basic sense of justice? We believe that the mistake is not the policy of preservation itself, but the anthropocentric instrumental framework in which it is justified. Environmental policy decisions should not merely concern the trade-off and comparison of various human benefits. If environmentalists claim that the Third World must preserve its environment because of the overall benefits for humanity, then decision makers in the Third World can demand justice in the determination of preservation policy: preservationist policies unfairly damage the human interests of the local populations. If preservationist policies are to be justified without a loss of equity, there are only two possible alternatives: either we in the industrialized world must pay for the benefits we will gain from preservation or we must reject the anthropocentric and instrumental framework for policy decisions. The first alternative is an empirical political issue, and one about which we are not overly optimistic. The second alternative represents a shift in philosophical world view. We are not providing a direct argument for a nonanthropocentric value system as the basis of environmental policy. Rather, our strategy is indirect. Let us assume that a theory of normative ethics which includes nonhuman natural value has been justified. In such a situation, the human community, in addition to its traditional human-centered obligations, would also have moral obligations to nature or to the natural environment in itself. One of these obligations would involve the urgent necessity for environmental preservation. We would be obligated, for example, to the Amazon rain forest directly. We would preserve the rain forest, not for the human benefits resulting from this preservation, but because we have an obligation of preservation to nature and its ecosystems. Our duties would be directed to nature and its inhabitants and environments, not merely to humans and human institutions. From this perspective, questions of the trade-off and comparison of human benefits, and questions of justice for specific human populations, do not dominate the discussion. This change of emphasis can be illustrated by an exclusively human example. Consider two businessmen, Smith and Jones, who are arguing over the proper distribution of the benefits and costs resulting from a prior business agreement between them. If we just focus on Smith and Jones and the issues concerning them, we will want to look at the contract, the relevant legal precedents, and the actual results of the deal, before rendering a decision. But suppose we learn that the agreement involved the planned murder of a third party, Green, and the resulting distribution of his property. At that point the issues between Smith and Jones cease to be relevant; we no longer consider who has claims to Green’s wallet, overcoat, or BMW to be important. The competing claims become insignificant in light of the obligations owed to Green. This case is analogous to our view of the moral obligations owed to the rain forest. As soon as we realize that the rain forest itself is relevant to the conflict of competing goods, we see that there is not a simple dilemma between Third World development, on the one hand, and preservation of rain forests, on the other; there is now, in addition, the moral obligation to nature and its ecosystems. When the nonanthropocentric framework is introduced, it creates a more complex situation for deliberation and resolution. It complicates the already detailed discussions of human trade-offs, high-tech transfers, aid programs, debtfor-nature swaps, sustainable development, etc., with a consideration of the moral obligations to nonhuman nature. This complication may appear counterproductive, but as in the case of Smith, Jones, and Green, it actually serves to simplify the decision. Just as a concern for Green made the contract dispute between Smith and Jones irrelevant, the obligation to the rain forest makes many of the issues about trade-offs of human goods irrelevant. 12  It is, of course, unfortunate that this direct obligation to the rain forest can only be met with a cost in human satisfaction—some human interests will not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the same can be said of all ethical decisions, or so Kant teaches us: we are only assuredly moral when we act against our inclinations. To summarize, the historical forces of economic imperialism have created a harsh dilemma for environmentalists who consider nature preservation in the Third World to be necessary. Nevertheless, environmentalists can escape the dilemma, as exemplified in the debate over the development of the Amazon rain forest, if they reject the axiological and normative framework of anthropocentric instrumental rationality. A set of obligations directed to nature in its own right makes many questions of human benefits and satisfactions irrelevant. The Amazon rain forest ought to be preserved regardless of the benefits or costs to human beings.  Once we move beyond the confines of human-based instrumental goods, the environmentalist position is thereby justified, and no policy dilemma is created. This conclusion serves as an indirect justification of a nonanthropocentric system of normative ethics, avoiding problems in environmental policy that a human-based ethic cannot. 1 Policy makers and philosophers in the Third World may not be pleased with our conclusions here. Indeed, Ramachandra Guha has recently criticized the focus on biocentrism (i.e., nonanthropocentrism) and wilderness preservation that per-vades Western environmentalism. These Western concerns are at best, irrelevant to, and at worst, destructive of Third World societies. According to Guha, any justifiable environmental movement must include solutions to problems of equity, “economic and political redistribution.” 14  We agree. Thus, as a final note, let us return from the abstract atmospheres of axiological theory and normative frameworks to the harsh realities of life in the non-industrialized world. If our argument is sound, then any destructive development of the natural environment in the Third World is a moral wrong, and a policy of environmental preservation is a moral requirement. Recognition of this moral obligation to preserve the natural environment should be the starting point for any serious discussion of developmental policy.
Thus the plan: Eritrea should prioritize the ideology of environmental protection over resource extraction when the two are in conflict.
Act 4 is the contention –
By prioritizing resource extraction, we view the Earth as an instrument for human ends in which we can abuse and pollute simply to benefit us. This is the root cause of the environmental crisis.

Sivil 2
(Richard, Richard Sivil studied at the University of Durban Westville, and at the ¶ University of Natal, Durban. He has been lecturing philosophy since ¶ 1996. His primary interest lies in the field of Ethics, Evnironmental Philosophy, Buddhist ¶ Philosophy and Quantum Physics, WHY WE NEED A NEW ETHIC FOR¶ THE ENVIRONMENT, 2000, http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm)
Three most significant and pressing factors contributing to the environmental crisis are the ever increasing human population, the energy crisis, and the abuse and pollution of the earth’s natural systems. These and other factors contributing to the environmental crisis can be directly linked to anthropocentric views of the world. The perception that value is located in, and emanates from, humanity has resulted in understanding human life as an ultimate value, superior to all other beings. This has driven innovators in medicine and technology to ever improve our medical and material conditions, in an attempt to preserve human life, resulting in more people being born and living longer. In achieving this aim, they have indirectly contributed to increasing the human population. Perceptions of superiority, coupled with developing technologies have resulted in a social outlook that generally does not rest content with the basic necessities of life. Demands for more medical and social aid, more entertainment and more comfort translate into demands for improved standards of living. Increasing population numbers, together with the material demands of modern society, place ever increasing demands on energy supplies. While wanting a better life is not a bad thing, given the population explosion the current energy crisis is inevitable, which brings a whole host of environmental implications in tow. This is not to say that every improvement in the standard of living is necessarily wasteful of energy or polluting to the planet, but rather it is the cumulative effect of these improvements that is damaging to the environment. The abuses facing the natural environment as a result of the energy crisis and the food demand are clearly manifestations of anthropocentric views that treat the environment as a resource and instrument for human ends. The pollution and destruction of the non-human natural world is deemed acceptable, provided that it does not interfere with other human beings.

Reliance on resources strips the planet because of perceived human needs and only by acknowledging the value of nature do we become one with nature.

Dalile, Boushra. Swinburne University of Technology, Psychology and Statistical Sciences, Undergraduate
According to the inelastic principles of both anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, the ability to make environmental decisions to satisfy both positions is difficult. Quite candidly, nature and humanity are devastated when anthropocentrism is practiced; and the conversion to ecocentrism overnight is impossible especially in the developed societies because of their heavy reliance on resources and generation of waste (Wapner and Matthew 2009, p. 212).
Deep ecologists’ platform claims that justification is made upon people only when their intervention in the natural wildlife is vital to human needs, i.e. for survival not for luxury (MacKinnon 2007, p. 339). According to George Sessions and Arne Naess’s (coiner of the term Deep Ecology in Naess 1973) basic principles of deep ecology, they encircle anthropocentrism and ecocentrism by acknowledgesing the intrinsic value in all nature’s beings and allowing consuming species to benefit from what the environment offers to fulfill vital needs. For instance, interfering with the environment to build a golf course or a house patio is unethical because they are hardly essential for survival, not to mention the alteration caused to Earth and vegetation (MacKinnon 2007, p. 339).

Act 5 is defining the debate space.
Debaters are partners working towards a higher truth, and in working towards a truth reciprocate rights in order to reach that truth. Without reciprocation, we can never reach truth.
Foucault (from an interview)

In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions Each person in the discussion is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on. As for the person answering the questions, the other,  too, exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse, he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of other. Questions and answers depend on a game —Debate depends on a game that is at once pleasant and difficult — in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue.

The polemic represents a rejection of reciprocal rights, which makes debate impossible. Debatability is an independent reason to prefer because if we cant debate then neither of us can win – precludes all other voters.
Foucault 2

The polemicist , on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; believes that the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that today we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passion, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn't dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgment and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated and either surrenders or disappears.

There are several implications:
1) Theory debates should be viewed as discussions meant to find better interpretations within which to discuss substance. This means that theory should only be evaluated if it improves the educational nature of the relationship between competitors. If s/he argues drop the arg, then the argument goes away and we resume discussion. If s/he argues drop the debater, then you as a judge should remove the polemic from the discussion and endorse the aff as a means of achieving a greater amount of truth.
2) This is a functional role of the ballot. Foucault reconceptualizes what it means to be the better debater as the debater who proved the truth or falsity of the resolution in this discussion.
3) Substantive arguments that simply advocate rejecting mindsets should be rejected themselves for being polemic. This isn’t biting back into the problem. You are simply removing the polemic in order to have a civil discussion. Fiat  has unique power in finding the truth, so we should use every tool we can to work towards this truth. This also means all perms are justified, including severance.
4) Truth precedes all other voters because we’re working as partners. If one side or the other is unfair, it doesn’t matter because this was the resolution given to us beforehand, and we need to find the truth. That’s why educational benefits don’t matter either, we aren’t here to gain the maximum amount of education, we’re here to find the truth, and only through truth can we reach the ultimate educational conclusion of which side of the resolution is true.

Tournament: Sunvite | Round: 2 | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any
Hey Y'all, for now I'm just posting texts and generic prep, for lulz, but I'm going to disclose full cites after Sunvite for stuffs that I've read, for educational and inclusionary purposes. 

BUT, if you would like to say "what's up" or ask about any of the prep I'm posting, email me at
andenick at gmail dot com
and I'd be happy to send you whatever you need! Anyone who knows me knows I give out a lot of prep, so shoot me a message if you need any help, if you think I'm special enough to help out. 

Aff prep (these are the cases I'm running, if you have any questions talk to me, each comes with an interchangeable FW, Theory, and in some cases contention lol which is why I'm not disclosing full):
Function AC
Side Constraint AC
Morally relevant Distinction AC
Analytic AC (K stuffs)

See you on the circuit!

edited for content.

Tournament: States | Round: Quarters | Opponent: Branse | Judge: Jack Ave, Fred Ditzian, Dawn Steirn
I affirm that placing political conditions on humanitarian aid to foreign countries is unjust.

Part 1 is my advocacy.

Advocacy Text: It is unjust for the United States to place political conditions furthering American imperialist or economic interests on humanitarian aid to foreign countries.

So, Supposedly democratic political conditions of American foreign involvement replicate the ideology of capitalism—this prevents change.
Dean 5 (Jodi, Zizek against Democracy, jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/files/zizek_against_ democracy_new_version.doc)

In this article, I take up Slavoj Zizek’s critical interrogation of democracy. I specify and defend Zizek’s position as an alternative left politics, indeed, as that position most attuned to the loss of the political today. Whereas liberal and pragmatic approaches to politics and political theory accept the diminishment of political aspirations as realistic accommodation to the complexities of late capitalist societies as well as preferable to the dangers of totalitarianism accompanying Marxist and revolutionary theories, Zizek’s psychoanalytic philosophy confronts directly the trap involved in acquiescence to a diminished political field, that is to say, to a political field constituted through the exclusion of the economy: within the ideological matrix of liberal democracy, any move against nationalism, fundamentalist, or ethnic violence ends up reinforcing Capital and guaranteeing democracy’s failure.  Arguing that formal democracy is irrevocably and necessarily “stained” by a particular content that conditions and limits its universalizability, he challenges his readers to relinquish our attachment to democracy:  if we know that the procedures and institutions of constitutional democracies privilege the wealthy and exclude the poor, if we know that efforts toward inclusion remain tied to national boundaries, thereby disenfranchising yet again those impacted by certain national decisions and policies, and if we know that the expansion and intensification of networked conformity that was supposed to enhance democratic participation serves primarily to integrate and consolidate capitalism, why do we present our political hopes as aspirations to democracy, rather than something else? Why in the face of democracy’s obvious inability to represent justice in the social field that has emerged in the incompatibility between the globalized economy and welfare states to displace the political, do critical left political and cultural theorists continue to emphasize a set of arrangements that can be filled in, substantialized, by fundamentalisms, nationalisms, populisms, and conservatisms diametrically opposed to progressive visions of social and economic equality? The answer is that international democratic conformity is the form our attachment to Capital takes. Faithful to this democracy, we eschew the demanding task of politicizing the economy and envisioning a different political order.

“Human rights” are inevitably co-opted by neoliberal governmentality. Calls for conditions on humanitarian aid just obscure the ways that human rights are subservient to global capital, re-entrenching human rights abuses.
Erni 09 (John Nguyet Erni. “Human Rights In The Neo-liberal Imagination.” Cultural Studies. June 2nd, 2009. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6832/Erni_Human_Rights_in_the_Neo-liberal_Imagination.pdf)
Frank Garcia (1999, pp. 6465) suggests that the global neo-liberal imperative today re-constitutes trade laws with a particular vision of justice linked to a certain view of human nature and privileging a particular approach to moral reasoning: Trade law is exclusively concerned with the twin values of economic efficiency and welfare. The goal of trade law is to improve the economic well-being of human beings through the facilitation of efficient exchanges. This approach has several important implications for the viability of human rights law within a trade-based regulatory regime. First, there is a marked tendency for other values besides efficiency and welfare to be viewed as outside the scope of trade law, and even inimical to its purposes ... Second, economic analysis and methodology will exert a dominant, if not overweening, influence on trade and non-trade policy formed or implemented within trade institutions operating on an Efficiency Model. Taking Garcia’s first point, we are left with the impression that human rights law is external to the scope of trade law. Yet taking his second point, we are reminded of the existence of a presumptive order exerted by the logic of economic computation that extends from the empire of trade into the nontrade legal and social spaces. Garcia’s split vision illustrates an important point: in considering ‘the viability of human rights law within a trade-based regulatory regime,’ the insolent logic, concepts, reasoning, and models of trade may externalize human rights institutionally and operationally, it nonetheless enfolds human rights by redefining them epistemologically. Within the ambit of trade laws, the epistemological redefinition of human rights is demonstrated in international economic laws as they are revised by the WTO. Through a series of enhanced operations, the WTO has installed a regime that is capable of defining the condition of possibility for articulating rights-related concerns in global trade. For instance, important aspects of the global economy are increasingly regulated through treaty-based rules that subject human rights to the service of neo-liberal trade. Treaty rules spell out when and how human rights interests are permitted to be raised in the event of trade disputes and when and how they are, by doctrine, rejected from view. Trade rules also define the very terms under which human rights are conceived. Arguably, trade has become the epistemological source for rights. Andrew Lang (2007, p. 393) offers an insightful analysis of the concrete reality in a trade negotiation over human rights: 430 CULTURAL STUDIES Downloaded by   at 13:09 04 October 2011 In international fora, it is common to talk as if human rights are in some sense the source of ... ultimate policy prescriptions ... that human rights rules provide the criteria by which to arbitrate between alternative policy proposals. In fact, it takes only a moment’s thought to realize that precisely the opposite is occurring: human rights commentators are drawing on work produced by trade policy experts in the context of contemporary trade policy debates as a source of policy ideas and arguments ... When it comes to the analysis and evaluation of concrete policy proposals ... the discussion invariably tends to reproduce and rehearse precisely the same kinds of arguments which characterize trade policy discussions in other arenas and which are perfectly familiar to trade policy experts. At this point, the human rights language recedes into the background, and we are presented with a series of argumentative steps, sets of data, and ultimately policy prescriptions, which almost exactly reproduce those emanating from more traditional trade policy circles. In other words, human rights actors lobby for the inclusion of rights-based provisions in trade rules by deploying the type of professional expertise that is not only recognizable and familiar to, but also discursively mandated by, trade doctrines and the neo-liberal ideology underwriting those doctrines (see also Aaronson and Zimmerman 2006, Dommen 2002, Dunoff 2001). The point is that the argumentative gymnastics undertaken in formulating treaty-based rules is not sourced by human rights norms. Ironically, neo-liberal debates about the benefits and potential harm of global trade do not need human rights actors to state the importance of the protection of rights. Neoliberal trade is more than capable of generating its own concern for human rights. But the human rights concerns so generated do not emanate from human rights law or ideology. For instance, trade rules do recognize the need for private providers of essential services, like food and health care, to be subjected to strict regulatory oversight. But the technical calculation for that regulatory oversight is a built-in feature of trade, and not a specialized feature of human rights norm. Moreover, when there is recognition that domestic agricultural subsidies ought to be reduced so as not to disadvantage smaller nations in agricultural trade, the foundation of that recognition is derived from the econometric models inherent within the trade logic, and has little to do with the justice-based human rights logic. Likewise, in TRIPS agreements (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), the establishment of what is called ‘flexibility rules’ that allow developing countries to bypass patent laws in times of public emergency (such as the case of Thailand or Brazil to develop generic HIV drugs), resulted from the technical calculation of permissible profit thresholds more than from altruistic humanitarian motives (see Ho 2007, Joseph 2003). As a result, human rights norms have a radically minor role to play in the formulation of trade laws. Instead, replacing human HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NEO-LIBERAL IMAGINATION 431 Downloaded by   at 13:09 04 October 2011 rights norms and obligations are broad and non-descript ‘human rights issues’ erected, ironically, through a disconnection from human rights ethos. erected, ironically, through a disconnection from human rights ethos. Conclusion An analysis of the structure of the global instrumentalization of human rights suggests that international law designed to constrain state conduct appears publicly to champion a moral-juridical ethos, but in reality it has inadvertently instituted a fundamental re-configuration of human rights as network effects of market forces. Human rights therefore incorporate at their heart a secret relation to capital which they claim to oppose. Former WTO DirectorGeneral Mike Moore (2003, pp. 249250) asserts that democratic global trade will lead to ‘longer and more sustained peace, longer and more sustained economic growth, and a fairer and better society.’ As a result, ‘there is no outside to this harmonious whole, no need or desire that can or should disrupt the workings of the WTO as a ‘‘linkage machine.’’ Human rights can be conceived as just one more link in a chain made larger to accommodate this set of interests’ (Orford 2006, p. 158). Similar to Foucault’s assertion of how the biopolitical project of the modern state places life at the center of the state’s administrative calculations, the networked and disaggregated states of today seem to institute a tie uniting capital and rights.

Part 2 is your ballot.

Vote aff to adopt the historical material criticism of the 1AC - historical analysis of the material conditions of capital is the only way to break free from is contradictions and social inequalities it causes
Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

Historical materialism must come first - it predetermines consciousness and the very possibilities of reflective thinking
Marx 1859 (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM
edited for gendered language

In the social production of their existence, people inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of people that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.  In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which people become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.  

Historical materialist understanding of the way that consciousness is shaped by social reality is key to negate the ideology of ambivalence and contradiction embraced by postmodernism.  This is a prerequisite to transforming capitalist social relations and solving the aff because the reality of class conflict is the methodological dynamo of our times.
Gonzalez 2004 Marcial, “Historical Materialism and Chicana/o Cultural Studies,” Science and Society 68.2
I shall draw this essay to a close by proposing a historical materialist criticism for the study of Chicana/o literature. But to attempt comprehensive description of historical materialism in these short pages would be futile. I shall therefore briefly discuss six issues re- lated to historical materialism that will serve as a starting point for better understanding the method I am proposing. First, historical materialism attempts to understand the dialecti- cal relation between the particularities of existence and the larger social frameworks that give them meaning. R. Saldivar, for example, puts this dialectical procedure in motion when he reads Chicana/o narratives not as the transparent replication of events, but as texts that imagine the "ways in which historical men and women live out their lives as class subjects," a project that involves "attaining a true knowledge of society as a whole" (R. Saldivar, 1990, 6). Dialectical criticism enables a comprehension of "society as a whole" through the "abstraction from specific real conditions, followed by systematic analysis, and then by successive reapproximations to the real, all made necessary because everyday experience catches only the delusive ap- pearance of things" (89). Second, as a dialectical system historical materialism comes into conflict with postmodernist theory. As Steven Best and Douglas Kellner point out, postmodernism not only promotes a skeptical view of his- tory and subjectivity, it "aggressively rejects dialectics" (Best and Kellner, 1991, 222) . They offer a lucid analysis of the tension between dialectics and postmodernism, arguing that dialectics "attempts to describe how concrete particulars are constituted by more general and abstract social forces, undertaking an analysis of particulars to illuminate these broader social forces but postmodern theory re- jects dialectics in principle . . . and thus is unable to conceptualize the dialectic of totalization and fragmentation" (223). Deleuze aptly encapsulates the postmodernist attitude toward dialectics when he declares: "What I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the Dialectic" (Deleuze, 1977, 112). Without an understanding of the relation between universal processes and their local manifes- tations, postmodernism ends up producing a fetish of social fragmen- tation by privileging concepts such as "schizophrenia" to describe the ideal postmodern (non)-subject. Third, historical materialism affords avenues for understanding the complex categories of identity based on race, ethnicity, sexuality and gender, not as autonomous formations but as interconnected processes within the larger dynamics of social relations. This is what Stuart Hall has in mind when he characterizes the category of race as "the modality in which class is lived" (Hall, 1996, 55). Hall theo- rizes the thorny relation between these categories, recognizing the particularity and relative autonomy of race without jettisoning the causal character of class relations. From a similar perspective, Teresa Ebert argues "for a revolutionary understanding and engagement with historical materialism for feminism in postmodernity," and she does so "at a time when feminism, for the most part, has lost the revo- lutionary knowledges of historical materialism so necessary to under- stand the exploitative relations of labor and production and to trans- form them" (Ebert, 1996, xi). In adopting a theoretical model and argumentative approach similar to Ebert's, I would characterize my own method as an engagement with historical materialism for U. S. ethnic literary studies generally, and for Chicana/o literary studies in particular, and I propose this method at a time when literary and cultural studies in race and ethnicity "for the most part, have lost the revolutionary knowledges of historical materialism," succumbing instead to the epistemological and political limitations of method- ologies emerging from what Best and Kellner call "the postmodern turn." Fourth, the categories and concepts of historical materialism are not pre-established truths set in stone. To argue that dialectical criti- cism represents an absolute truth would amount to a contradiction in terms since such an argument would tend to reify the methodologi- cal approach. In a much cited passage, Georg Lukács argues, "or- thodox Marxism . . . does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations. It is not the 'belief ' in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a 'sacred' book. ... It refers exclusively to method" (Lukács, 1971, 1). Similarly, Peter Knapp and Alan Spector explain, "dialectics is a way of looking at reality, not as a complex of ready-made 'things' but as a set of processes. The dialectical approach examines the ways that everything changes. A dialectical approach asks . . . How do these changes connect to the rest of the world? This concern with change and interrelation implies that dialectical analyses are usually historical" (Knapp and Spector, 1991, 264). Ad- ditionally, Alfred Sohn-Rethel argues that historical materialism should not be considered a "world view" or an empirical science about how the world operates; nor should it be assumed that historical ma- terialism possesses a predetermined set of laws requiring only that an astute practitioner impose those laws from the outside on the object of study (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 189-204). Fifth, the goal of Marxism is not to correct faulty ideas but to negate them - to critique them, to transform them qualitatively. As Ebert argues, for instance, "ludic" postmodernism must be "critiqued" not simply because its theories about society and culture are faulty (even if they are in fact faulty), but because they function as ideol- ogy that correlates to real social contradictions. For a theory to be faulty implies that it can be corrected. The Marxist critique of post- modernism does not serve as an analytical corrective, but as an en- gagement that leads to a démystification of real contradictions. In a similar vein, Sohn-Rethel explains that the superiority of historical materialism over other methods of interpretation does not rest in the claim that it is capable of arriving at better or more correct analyses. The difference between Marxism and other methods cannot be mea- sured on a quantitative scale, where the various methods measure up as more or less correct. Finally (in an effort to synthesize the five points just outlined) , historical materialism should be considered a "methodological pos- tulate" (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 189-204) that makes truth-claims about social existence, but only after a thorough critique of the concepts and ideas associated with that existence. As a "methodological pos- tulate," historical materialism stands opposed to unmediated reflec- tion theory, which can be considered a pseudo-materialist approach based on the premise that, because social existence determines con- sciousness, consciousness logically must reflect social existence. His- torical materialism agrees that social existence determines conscious- ness, but it holds that consciousness does not "reflect" social existence transparently. On the contrary, consciousness necessarily mystifies the social world because it functions not independently from social real- ity, as in unmediated reflection theory, but as an integral part of re- ality. In the same way that Marx showed how "capital is not a thing, but a social relation established by the instrumentality of things" (Marx, 1974, 766), Sohn-Rethel argues that the intellect is not "pure thought," but rather an abstraction of universal social relations, es- tablished concretely by the instrumentality of cognition. Further, the abstractions that take place in both commodity exchange and cogni- tion operate, at one level, to conceal social relations and, on another, as a "social synthesis" to maintain cohesion and stability within the mode of production out of which they emerge. Thus, for Sohn-Rethel, although existence produces "necessarily false consciousness," it is only through a critical study of this con- sciousness that the historical materialist arrives at a greater knowl- edge of social existence, as if attempting to solve a mystery entirely with clues that are intentionally designed to lead the investigator down a false trail. But even if the clues are false, the truth may be approxi- mated from the formal logic and content of the distortions them- selves. "Roughly," Sohn-Rethel argues, "the Marxist approach to his- torical reality can be understood as answering the question: what must the existential reality of society be like to necessitate such and such a form of consciousness?" (197). He adds: Thus, methodologically the subject-matter of Marx's critique is not the his- torical reality of this or that form of social existence but, in the first instance, a particular mode of consciousness - namely, that of political economy; it is thoughts, not things. It is the concepts of "value," "capital," "profit," "rent," etc., as he found them defined and discussed in the writings of economists. He does not deal directly with realities, does not elaborate concepts of his own which, as "correct" ones, he would oppose to the "false" ones of the economists. His approach is characteristically different. It is an approach to reality, but by way of the "critique" of the historically given consciousness. (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 195.) Following Sohn-Rethel's argument, a historical materialist critique of postmodernism and its influences on Chicana/o cultural studies should not be understood as a critique of social existence as such - even if the goal is to arrive at a better understanding of social exis- tence in order to develop more effective strategies for changing so- ciety. A Marxist critique of postmodernism should be viewed rather as a critique of ideas and theories that emerge from a particular his- torical reality, which we can now hypothesize as a politically unstable, economically chaotic, contradiction-ridden capitalist mode of pro- duction that must increasingly give the appearance of being stable in order to maintain cohesion - or, when the deception of instabil- ity no longer remains feasible, must make the instability and chaos appear natural and perhaps even progressive, as in the case of post- modernist thought. Historical materialism, then, does not begin with the premise that it possesses a more truthful account of social reality than does postmodernism; it claims only that the critique of the lat- ter by the former initiates a dialectical process through which social contradictions and other previously concealed truths about social existence become evident. In this essay I have argued that Chicana/o writers and critics hold much interest in explaining ideological ambivalence in both creative and critical works. Postmodernism, however, hinders rather than helps in these efforts because it celebrates the appearances and ef- fects of fragmentation, rather than engaging in a critique of its causes - or rather than theorizing a viable response to alienation. From a Marxist perspective, ideological ambivalence reflects the symptoms of reification resulting from the individualizing and divisive needs of a capitalist mode of production. Thus, the ambivalence of Chicana/o literature represents real social contradictions, mediated in the com- plex nexus of author, reader, text and history. From this perspective, postmodernism's celebration of fragmentation coupled with its vicious attacks against the concept of totality reproduces its own reified con- dition. Despite this apparent paradox, Chicana/o cultural criticism nonetheless has turned in the direction of the postmodern. Post- modernist theory might be considered one of the most popular forms of "ideology critique" on the cultural studies market today, but to my mind postmodernism has become the ideology, not the critique.

Part 3 is the additional impacts.

First, Neoliberalism precludes ethics by reducing decision-making to economic self-interest.
Tawanda Sachakonye (Rhodes University). “A Foucauldian Critique of Neo-liberalism.” January 2010. http://eprints.ru.ac.za/1812/3/Sachikonye-MA-TR10-48.pdf
In terms of individual citizens neo-liberal government promotes the notion of the responsible citizen. Thus, the ideal individual in neo-liberal society practises personal responsibility by making informed rational decisions. Neo-liberal democracy therefore ?aspires to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts? (Lemke, 2001: 201). Neo-liberal governments together with corporations create conditions in which the responsible rational individual can become a successful entrepreneur or consumer. The success or failure of the individual depends on his or her skill and work ethic. Hence, life for an individual in neo-liberal society becomes one of personal responsibility to a greater extent. Giroux 53 argues that under neo-liberalism the state no longer assumes responsibility for social needs and rather focuses on initiating various ?deregulations and privatizations‘, whilst relinquishing all social responsibility to the ?market and private philanthropy‘ (2004). The neo-liberal state has no real obligation towards its citizens except to provide the necessary conditions for entrepreneurship and consumerism. As a result, a kind of Darwinist ‘survival of the fittest’ ethic becomes apparent; Giroux argues that: ?social Darwinism has been resurrected from the ashes of the 19th century sweatshops and can now be seen in full bloom in most reality TV programs and in the unfettered self-interests that now drives popular culture. As narcissism is replaced by unadulterated materialism, public concerns collapse into utterly private considerations and where public space does exist it is mainly used as a confessional for private woes, a cut throat game of winner take all, or an advertisement for consumerism? (2004) 54 . This is a sentiment that is echoed by Bourdieu 55 , who states that this form of moral Darwinism establishes what he terms the ‘cult of the winner’ and ultimately institutes a survival of the fittest mentality that is underpinned by cynicism and self interest (1998). The neo-liberal state utilises knowledge like market research as a technique of power. This is similar to how the government in the 17 th century viewed statistics as the ?science of the state‘ and a component of the technology of government (Smart, 2002: 129). The neoliberal government can now use market research to indirectly control its citizens as well as gather information about their personal lives. Market research with its use of modern technology and accurate data supersedes census studies and statistics. Dufour writes: ?vast numbers of market researchers are therefore always taking the pulse of consumers and surveying their sexual and emotional lives, so as to anticipate their needs and to give their desires possible names and credible destinations? (2008: 58). The collecting of such information and the use of it to control citizens fits the Foucauldian critique. The field of marketing is a highly efficient technology of neo-liberal governance; it becomes a mechanism through which neo-liberal government can regulate a consumer society and provide specific products to cater for the varied needs of different individuals. Dufour notes: ?there is no such thing as a small profit. A profit can be made from babies who ?want‘ their favourite shampoo, senior citizens who ?want‘ to occupy their spare time and invest their savings, poor adolescents who ?want‘ cheap brand names and rich adolescents who ?want‘ their own cars. They must all be satisfied. ?I‘ is now central to every advert? (2008: 58). Neo-liberalism dominates society through subtle means. Thus, neo-liberalism does not seek ?to assert itself by placing disciplinary controls on life‘ (Dufour, 2008: 157). Neo-liberalism has permeated society by using subtle ?political technologies‘. These mechanisms of power transcend the old overt ?technologies‘: religion, the police and family, and are more flexible in that they are less reliant on coercion and are less costly, as noted by Dufour (2008: 157). The new political technologies of neo-liberal governance include: the internet, multimedia software, the fields of marketing and management, as well as telecommunications technology governance have yielded more control, management and surveillance than any traditional government could have hoped for. Neo-liberal governance has also managed to dehumanise human society by forcing the complexity of human difference into the narrow confines of entrepreneurialism, consumerism and the logic of self interest. Fine and Leopold write: ?are we the manipulated mannequins of the advertising industry, the sovereignless victims of profit-hungry corporate capital, rational economic man and women trading off one commodity against another according to their relative prices and utilities?? (1993: 3). This is indeed a grim question to fathom but one which neo-liberal governance has made pertinent. 

Second, We have an ethical obligation to resist global capitalism
Daly 4 (Glyn, Risking The Impossible) http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm, 2004)
For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today's global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture - with all its pieties concerning "multiculturalist" 6 etiquette - Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called "radically incorrect" in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today's social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and move recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian- Lacanian twist, the few of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the fives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals; such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose "universalism" fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded "life-chances" cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the "developing world"). And Zizek's point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek's universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a "glitch" in an otherwise sound matrix.4

Third, Marxist epistemology is intextricably tied to Marxist praxis – knowledge is derived from observation of the material and action is based on this
Noebel 6 (doctorate from American Christian College, studied, philosophy in graduate school at the University of Wisconsin–Madison., selection from “Understanding the Times: The Collision of Today’s Competing Worldviews” (Rev. 2nd ed), David Noebel, Summit Press, 2006, http://www.allaboutworldview.org/marxist-philosophy.htm)

When it comes to Marxist philosophy, science plays a crucial role in the Marxist theory of knowledge. According to Lenin, “The fundamental characteristic of materialism arises from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality, reflected by science.”6 Marxist epistemology, like that of the Secular Humanists, places faith in the truth of science and denies all religious truth claims. Putting their faith in science as the infallible source of all knowledge logically follows from Marxist beliefs about reality. According to Lenin, “Perceptions give us correct impressions of things. We directly know objects themselves.”7 The objects Lenin speaks of are strictly material—“Matter is . . . the objective reality given to man in his sensations, a reality which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations.”8 In contrast, anything supernatural lacks objective, material reality, so according to Marxism we have no means of perceiving it or of gaining knowledge about it. Thus, Marxists deny the supernatural. They distinguish between knowledge of the material world and what they term true belief in an attempt to allow for scientific speculation while ignoring speculation about God. “What we call ‘knowledge’ must also be distinguished from ‘true belief.’ If, for example, there is life on Mars, the belief that there is life on Mars is true belief. But at the same time we certainly, as yet, know nothing of the matter. True belief only becomes knowledge when backed by some kind of investigation and evidence. Some of our beliefs may be true and others false, but we only start getting to know which are true and which are false when we undertake forms of systematic investigation. . . . For nothing can count as ‘knowledge’ except in so far as it has been properly tested.”9 Therefore, Marxist epistemology declares that we can never know belief in the supernatural as “true belief” because we cannot test it scientifically or empirically. We can determine as true beliefs only our speculations about the material world because only these can undergo systematic investigation. Thus, knowledge can apply only to the material world. Marxists believe that practice—testing knowledge throughout history—is also a valuable tool for gaining knowledge. We can test knowledge by applying it to our lives and society, and this application will eventually determine its truth or falsity. By examining history, we can determine which beliefs are true and which are not. Marxist epistemology is inextricably tied to Marxist dialectics. In fact, it is virtually impossible to separate Marxist materialism, dialectics, and epistemology. This is true largely because Marxists claim that dialectics operates in the place of metaphysics in their philosophy.¶ Marxist Philosophy – Conclusion Dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism, contains an epistemology, a cosmology, an ontology, and an answer to the mind-body problem. For the Marxist, science and practice refine knowledge; the universe is infinite and all that will ever exist; matter is eternal and the ultimate substance; life is a product of this non-living matter; and the mind is a reflection of this material reality. But the Marxist philosophy embraces an even broader view of the world than is generally meant by the term philosophy. In truth, dialectical materialism is an entire method for viewing the world—it colors the Marxist perception of everything from ethics to history.

Tournament: States | Round: 1 | Opponent: Help idk | Judge: Help I dont remember
1AC
;-)
Because I believe that humanitarian aid is aimed at recognizing that each and every single human is invaluable, I affirm. “Resolved: Placing political conditions on humanitarian aid to foreign countries is unjust.”

Because the evaluation of the resolution is reliant upon proving that these conditions are unjust, we have to define the word unjust.

New Oxford American Dictionary defines unjust as “not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.” This means that any action that isn’t based directly in what is morally right and fair is unjust. This means that it is the negative burden to prove that their political conditions are based in what is morally right.

Thus the value is morality.

Also, we presume that things are unjust before they are just for two reasons.
First, we presume that state action is immoral before it is authorized because if we just assumed that all state action is okay before moral evaluation, we could justify any number of atrocities.
Second, burdens on their own are immoral, especially in the case of burdens on humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid is an undeniable good, because both the intent and the actions taken are intrinsically good.
This means that absent any offense or in the face of a close to irresolvable debate, default aff because I still meet the truth statement of the resolution.

FW
Now, for the Framework.
First, Morality must respect the intrinsic worth of humans.
Immanuel Kant writes Framework for the Metaphysics of Morals. Immanuel Kant.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, but must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations, themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, have only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These rational beings, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.

Privileging some agents over others is inconsistent because there is no natural objective reason to give one agent more worth than another, so denying the worth of one agent denies the worth of all agents by denying that which makes all agents valuable.
Artificial constructions of value fail because they don’t provide objective reasons for constraining actions.
Further, One necessary and sufficient condition of all moral systems is that it treats people equally. If a moral system doesn’t apply to all people equally, then it doesn’t qualify as a moral system, and cannot prove the resolution true or false.

Second, the ultimate source of value in any and everything exists dependent on them being valued by it being valued by humans. Down even to the level of pleasure and happiness exist only in their dependence on human desire. In order for any value to be conferred, the conferrer of value has to have a value independent of any other. Otherwise no value would exist at all. If the conferrers, or humans don’t matter, then their own ends and all other contingent ideals are completely worthless.
This human capacity for value stems from practical reason—the ability to distance oneself from desires and consider whether they present reasons for action—so respecting peoples' capacity to value things requires treating humanity as an end in itself. 

This is only basis of morality that avoids begging the question because asking why we value reasons implicitly concedes the power of reasons.

And, proper understanding of the world around us first requires a unified conception of the world, which only practical reason allows.
Korsgaard
Christine Korsgaard. “The Normative Constitution of Agency.” Harvard University.

The parallel point about theoretical reason comes in two steps. First of all, unity is needed for our conception of the world, because the business, the function, of a conception of the world is to enable you to find your way around in it and to act effectively in it. In order to conceive the world as the sort of place in which you can find your way around and act effectively, you have to conceive of the world it as a unified place. What that means is that so that the relations between the various things in the world can be traced and established. If we can say nothing about how two things or events or regions of space-time are related to each other, we cannot think of them as parts of a single unified world. If we cannot trace causal relations, in particular, we cannot act effectively, since we cannot take means to our ends. So it is the business of a conception of the world to establish these various relations. Further argument is required, of course, but I suppose that we may think of the relations in question as logical, spatiotemporal, and causal. Speaking very roughly, these are the relations established by the principles of logic and what Kant thought of as the a priori principles of the understanding. But – and this is the second step - in unifying our conception of the world, we are also unifying our minds themselves, and unifying them in a way that makes us the agents of that conception – that is, in a way that makes us active knowers. This is because the unity of the mind and the unity of its object are interdependent. Unless we conform our beliefs to logical and rational principles, our minds themselves are a mere heap of unrelated ideas that cannot really qualify as beliefs. A mere heap of unrelated ideas is not about anything, and therefore cannot count itself as thinking about anything or knowing anything. 

Three implications:

1. Practical reason controls the internal link to every moral system. Hence, in a system other then one that follows from practical reason all morality devolves into nihilism.
   2. All effective action, for example, the giving of humanitarian aid, must be based upon adherence to rules derived from practical reason.
   3. Practical reason is the basis of thought, so unless we unify our conception of the world we cannot even qualify our developments as thinking.

Third, even if the resolution isn’t moral, reason is still the basis of all determination. Functional arguments all link because rationality is the basis of all human interaction, even arguments about the nature of the government link because they’re based upon the rational consent or cooperation of individuals. Naturalistic arguments all have to link back to reason. Arguments about moral skepticism don’t make any sense because rationality solves back for all of the links. If justness is based in desirability, you still prefer rational systems of value because if we desire ends then it follows that we value the means to achieve those ends, because something that is necessary to achieve value must be normative, so means come before ends in terms of desirability. Further, we can desire means, and means can be ends. Likewise ends can be means.

VC

Thus the three conceptions of value at the top of my case culminate in a value criterion is respecting humans inviolable worth, meaning respecting the inviolable worth of each human being and not using others as means.
Respecting worth is the most important deontological side constraint because human worth is the root of all deontological obligations as individual rights only deserve respect because the person holding them deserves respect, violations of this particular side-constraint outweigh any other deontological obligations. Thus all social contract violations will link to respecting human worth.

Contention

C1. Placing political conditions on aid restricts the autonomy of those receiving the aid and those in the surrounding situation.
Chandler
Chandler, David. “The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda.” The Johns Hopkins University Press. August 2001. Web. 8 Feb 2013. www.jstor.org/stable/4489352
“The restrictions on humanitarian aid and universal charity mean that those persons dependent on aid have even less opportunity for autonomy than previously. In Bosnia, human rights NGOs like the International Crisis Group (ICG) have lobbied strongly for economic aid to be conditional on the implementation of the Dayton Accords and have argued that aid conditionality is the main source of leverage for the international community. In Serbia, European Union humanitarian aid programs operated on the highly selective basis of providing fuel and provisions to opposition-run municipalities while applying strict sanctions to the rest of the country. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Belgrade and the International Federation of the Red Cross challenged this approach by arguing that aid should be given on the basis of need and irrespective of political party affiliation. The politicization of humanitarian aid has led to even greater leverage over non-Western societies as NGOs and international institutions increasingly assume the right to make judgements about what is right and just, about whose capacities are built, and which local groups are favored. Where humanitarian aid started out as an expression of empathy with common humanity, it has been transformed through the discourse of human rights into a lever for strategic aims drawn up and acted upon by external agencies.”

Chandler explains that political conditions reduce the overall autonomy of people in these conditions because it creates leverage for the givers of aid. And, needlessly restricting autonomy is a huge impact into my value criterion of respecting human worth because our autonomy is what allows us to make decisions.

C2. There is a distinction between acts and omissions, meaning that there is a difference between killing someone and letting someone die.

First, if there is no distinction between acts and omissions then all actors have infinite positive obligations. It would be the same thing if I did nothing at my house or if I went out on a killing spree, which makes it impossible to be moral or just, and those ideals have to be achievable.

Second, arguments that try to destroy the distinction between acts and omissions assume that when you’re not saving someone’s life, for example, they assume that you’re running away, but there’s no way to make sure that omissions are actions in the first place.

Third, arguments that delineate between acts and omissions for states are incoherent, because they assume that states can take every action whatsoever. States are bound by their worldliness.

The implication is that you would affirm because affirming is choosing to not put political conditions, which is always just. Placing conditions on humanitarian aid always has a risk of being immoral, which is sufficient to affirm because the conditions could be unjust, which means that they’re not based in what is morally right.

C3. Humanitarian aid was based on the idea of using people as a means.
Chandler 2
Chandler, David. “The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda.” The Johns Hopkins University Press. August 2001. Web. 8 Feb 2013. www.jstor.org/stable/4489352
“The organization that over the last century has most epitomized the values of humanitarian universalism has been the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC or Red Cross).' The Red Cross established that humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and universality are were the underlying principles of any humanitarian intervention. The principle of humanity was based on the desire to assist the wounded and suffering without discrimination, recognizing a common humanity, and that ‘our enemies are men.’ The principle of impartiality derived from the desire to assist without discrimination except on the basis of needs, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress. The principle of neutrality bound Red Cross workers from taking sides in conflict or engaging in political or social controversies. The principle of universality claimed that the ICRC approach was the same the world over on the basis that the humanitarian values were shared universally. These four principles were predicated on separating the humanitarian sphere from the political one. The avoidance of politics was essential to the definition of humanitarianism. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the ICRC, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, in November 1992, made this clear: ‘humanitarian endeavour and political action must go their separate ways if the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian work are not to be jeopardized.’ Jean Pictet, one of the ICRC's leading thinkers warned that ‘Red Cross institutions must beware of politics as they would of poison, for it threatens their
very lives.’ As Michael Ignatieff notes, humanitarianism was the core of the ICRC's nonpolitical outlook: ‘it makes no distinction between good wars and bad, between just and unjust causes, or even between aggressors and innocents.’”

The second Chandler card explains that humanitarian aid, by definition, isn’t at all political. This means that any political conditions on aid would both be definitionally inconsistent, and using humanity as means to some political end.

Tournament: Princeton | Round: 1 | Opponent: Special Opponents | Judge: Special Judges
I advocate that the United States should exclude electronic communications from protection under Attorney Client Privilege through normal means. 

I'll use interchangeable contentions / tricks / paragraph theory / framework. E-mail me or message me on Facebook if you want to know exactly what I read for a round or some other reason.
andenick at gmail.com

Tournament: Sunvite | Round: 1 | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any
Text: Ghana should prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction when the two are in conflict.
Text: Developing countries should prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction when the two are in conflict.
Text: The People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia should pass legislation to disincentivize ecologically unsound slash and burn farming techniques by increasing performance payments incentives to local landowners and corporations in the form of monetary payments and land tenures. I reserve the right to clarify.
Text: The People's Republic of China should amend all relevant jurisdictional legislation in order to prevent multinational corporations from overexploiting resources when they are within 100 miles of any protected area. Protected areas are clarified in solvency adv.

Tournament: Nov Dec | Round: 1 | Opponent: NA | Judge: NA
Hey Y'all!

Apparently there's been some talking about my Fem Aff that we broke at Princeton and some speculation about it being "sexist" and "offensive," two things I definitely do not want to be known for, so I decided I'd post the aff here and dispel some comments I've heard about it.

If anything here is unclear - or even offensive - I'd really appreciate it if you facebooked me or emailed me at
andenick at gmail dot com

Here we go!

https://db.tt/4nb0mCAI

^{The Aff}

The first thing some are saying is that "The topics about ACP there's no reason to be talking about sex it's not creative; it's objectifying." And while I do believe that could be a viable arg in round (if the plan wasn't specific to relationships and not just sex) - its not a reason why the plan is offensive. Let's take a look at the actual plan text:

"The ABA should amend Rule 1.8 (j) and all other relevant jurisdictional legislation to prohibit intimate relationships between Attorneys and clients in order to remove obstructions to the guilt-finding process, and to waive the attorney client privilege in all investigations of possible violations of the rule. I reserve the right to clarify the spirit of the text, and the meaning of the rules involved."

Does contain a shift in precedence and a waiver of ACP - I do believe it is topical. But even if it isn't topical it claims to be - and works through a feminist framework to solve a problem in the criminal justice system. Feminism is run on ever topic - and it may not always seem topical - but it certainly isn't meant to be offensive.

The second indict a lot of people are making is "You're assuming the lawyer is a man which is entrenching the mindset women can't have those important jobs. By the women being the client it assumes she is either a criminal or helpless."

Not having hit the aff - I could understand the dilemma - but if y'all would ask to see the plan or check out what I posted, you could see that I cite a study that "96 of these relationships are between a male attorney and a female client." (PETER RUETTER, SEX IN THE FORBIDDEN ZONE 20 (1989) (Ninety-six percent of sexual exploitation by professionals occurs between a man in power and a woman under his care)). It's not an assumption we made - it's a problem we wanted to talk about solving. 

Further - the plan text also isn't specific to women - its all of these relationships. We wanted to help all of the people being oppressed. If you'd read the framework you could check out how we are working towards solving a problem for a group of people who are being affected differently within the system - this is where we garner our impacts. It just so happens that a majority of that group is made up of women.

The third - and I believe most flawed - indict of the plan is that "I don't think boys should be running fem because if men are oppressing women then they shouldn't also be liberating them bc then they're still in control." 

Whoa.

So we're going to forbid boys from running these arguments because they're the oppressors - because I'm an oppressor? Because boy debaters that run feminist arguments are oppressors? I really hope I don't need to go any further to talk about how absurd this claim is. 

That's about it. If we offended you - I'm sorry, it's just a case. We didn't make this problem up, its a real world dilemma and there are many, many authors who talk about the problems within it. I really didn't mean it, nor did any of my teammates. 

Hope that cleared everything up.

See y'all on the circuit!